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THE Supreme Court’s two most recent opinions on personal juris-diction usher in a new era in the law of general and specific per-sonal jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,1 the Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction, making it available primarily
in an individual’s domicile and a corporation’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business.2 In the specific jurisdiction case of Walden v.
Fiore, the Court, correspondingly, turned away from a strict purposeful
availment approach and toward an approach that permits consideration
of the relation of both the defendant and the litigation to the forum
state.3 If the Court stays this course, specific jurisdiction could assume the
central role in personal jurisdiction analysis that Bauman claims for it.4
The Court, however, must resist the temptation—evident in Walden v.
Fiore itself—to substitute fictions designed to limit the reach of specific
jurisdiction5 for the more functional, reasonableness analysis permitted
by International Shoe.6 This Article concludes with a version of an inter-
est analysis that will allow specific jurisdiction to play the central role that
it must, given the Court’s narrowing of general jurisdiction.7
Three years ago, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
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1. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
2. Id. at 760-61 & nn.19-20; see also infra notes 13 and 262-279, and accompanying
text.
3. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125-26 (2014).
4. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755 (stating that specific jurisdiction “has become the cen-
terpiece of modern jurisdiction theory”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (quoting in turn Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 628 (1988)).
5. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead. Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1958)  (advocating, at least for individual defendants, a continu-
ation of Pennoyer’s power theory of jurisdiction); see also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64
FLA. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (2012) (noting that, although International Shoe rejected the fic-
tion of implied consent, the Court ultimately substituted the construct of purposeful avail-
ment, which required “an analogous evaluation of the defendant’s underlying activities in
the forum”).
6. Int’l Shoe Co. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324, 326 (1945); see infra notes 117-147,
and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Rhodes, supra note 5, at 433 (concluding, after Goodyear, that, “in light of
the diminished scope of general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction must reach to nonresi-
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the Supreme Court began the move toward its new doctrinal approach.8
The Goodyear Court held that general jurisdiction based on the extent
and nature of a corporate defendant’s forum contacts is available only
when a defendant’s activities are so “continuous and systematic” that the
defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum state.9 The potential nar-
rowing of general jurisdiction was important and consonant with persis-
tent scholarly commentary. Broadly permitting general jurisdiction when
a defendant has continuous and systematic forum contacts multiplies the
forums in which a defendant may be sued on claims unrelated to its in-
state activity, may permit a plaintiff unwarranted forum choice, and has
impeded U.S. entry into international treaties.10 Some lower courts, nev-
ertheless, interpreted Goodyear broadly and continued to permit general
jurisdiction based on a defendant’s continuous and systematic forum con-
tact.11 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman
completed the narrowing of general jurisdiction. Bauman indicates that
general jurisdiction will be available primarily in a corporate defendant’s
state of incorporation and principal place of business.12 It will not be
available based on a defendant’s “continuous and systematic” forum con-
tact, absent exceptional circumstances.13
The Court’s restriction of general jurisdiction, though long recom-
mended by commentators, raises real concerns.14 A limited scope for gen-
dents causing harms or effects in the forum unless the jurisdictional assertion will be un-
duly burdensome”); Twitchell, supra note 4, at 652.
8. See Goodyear Dunlap Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
9. Id. at 2851, 2856-57.
10. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762-63 (2014); see also, e.g., Patrick J.
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 119, 123-24
(2001); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721,
725-26 (1988); Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 924-25, 946-47 (2000); Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of
“Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S. C. L. REV. 527, 528, 532, 540-41 (2012);
Twitchell, supra note 4, at 670-72; Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1141-44 (1966).
11. See, e.g., Susanna Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court
Should Duck the Issue in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
111, 118-19 & n.32 (2013) (citing J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 2013 WL
452807 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 6, 2013); Ashbury Int’l Group v. Cadex Defence, Inc., 2012 WL
4325183 (W.D. Va., Sept. 20, 2012); and McFadden v. Fuyao N. America Inc., 2012 WL
1230046 (E.D. Mich., Apr. 12, 2012)).
12. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 746, 760-61 & nn.19-20. See also infra notes 262-279, and
accompanying text.
13. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760-61. The Bauman Court did provide space for general
jurisdiction outside its paradigmatic instances, but a discussion of that issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
14. E.g., Brilmayer, et al, supra note 10, at 726, 742-43, 782; Stein, supra note 10, at
532; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 667-70 (concluding that the “best approach to general juris-
diction” is to limit it to a defendant’s “home base” and, thus, recognize its “most essential
function,” that of “providing one forum where a defendant may always be sued”); von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1139, 1141-44, 1177-79; see also Mary Twitchell,
Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
171, 203-14 (exploring methods of reducing doing-business, general jurisdiction; assessing
the likelihood of their adoption; and arguing, at least, for a more restricted general jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations).
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eral jurisdiction was supposed to have followed, rather than preceded, an
expansion of specific jurisdiction.15 Confining general jurisdiction princi-
pally to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of busi-
ness and recognizing only limited instances of specific jurisdiction would
mean that, in many cases, the plaintiff would have to pursue a corporate
defendant in its state of incorporation or principal place of business, or
the plaintiff would have to forego suit. In a world in which corporations
can and do operate regionally, nationally, and internationally, this would
be unacceptable, and it is not required by the Due Process Clause.
Commentators had predicted, post-International Shoe, that specific ju-
risdiction would flower and general jurisdiction would wither.16 Courts
would predominantly hale defendants to foreign jurisdictions based on
“specific” jurisdiction, i.e., based on the range of claims reasonably con-
nected with a defendant’s in-state activity or in-state impacts.17 Supreme
Court decisions would refine and broaden the scope of specific jurisdic-
tion. Correspondingly, the need would decline for expansive notions of
general jurisdiction, that is, for multiple forums in which a defendant
could be sued for any and all claims, related or not, to the defendant’s
forum contacts. Specific jurisdiction would create a sort of traveling zone
of limited, controversy-based personal jurisdiction that would accompany
a defendant and make it amenable to suit wherever its in-state activities
or impacts caused harm, but only when plaintiffs sought to sue on suffi-
ciently connected litigation.
When specific jurisdiction reached its maturity, general jurisdiction
should, and would, be pruned—cut back, perhaps, to only states of an
individual’s “home” or domicile and, by analogy for corporations, to
states of incorporation and principal place of business, and to other states
that closely approximate the home forum.18 Two subplots undermined
this narrative: The Supreme Court has failed to agree on an analysis for
specific jurisdiction cases involving limited forum contacts, and it has not
resolved cases involving loosely related claims. Both gaps in doctrine
15. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 10, at 119, 129-32, 139 (noting, among other things,
that “current specific jurisdiction doctrine contains several irrational elements, some of
which make general jurisdiction an unpleasant necessity”); Twitchell, supra note 4, at 637-
39, 676 (identifying that courts were using contacts-based general jurisdiction to avoid de-
termining the scope of specific jurisdiction and concluding that, if specific jurisdiction ex-
panded to include all instances in which claims related to the defendant’s forum contact,
general jurisdiction could assume an appropriate and more “modest role”); von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 10, at 1177-79.
16. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 241, 274-75, 281-88; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1174-79;
Winton D. Woods, Pennoyer’s Demise: Personal Jurisdiction after Shaffer and Kulko and a
Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 861, 880-98 (1978).
17. E.g., Woods, supra note 16, at 867, 880-93; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10,
at 1147-63, 1166-76; see also Hazard, supra note 16, at 245.
18. E.g., Borchers, supra note 10, at 139 (advocating for “more rational bases of spe-
cific jurisdiction coupled with modest bases of general jurisdiction”); Brilmayer et al.,
supra note 10, at 742-43; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 666-70; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 10, at 1174-79.
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stem from a single source—the failure to establish a coherent theory of
specific jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s case law on specific jurisdiction has not, in fact,
been expansive. The Court has narrowed specific jurisdiction by requiring
that a defendant exhibit sufficient purposeful availment, i.e., sufficient
purposeful direction of its conduct at a forum, in order to protect the
“territorial limitations on the power of the respective States”19 and to
provide clear notice to defendant that it could be subject to suit in a par-
ticular forum.20
Many lower courts, moreover, have confined specific jurisdiction in an-
other critical way. Even when a defendant has significant forum contact,
many courts require the plaintiff’s claim to “arise out of,” rather than
more loosely “relate to” those contacts.21 The Supreme Court has
avoided weighing in on this “relatedness” issue.22 Thus, many lower
courts have denied specific jurisdiction when a defendant has substantial,
purposeful forum contacts, but the claim is only loosely related.23 Others
previously stretched “general” jurisdiction to cover these cases, conclud-
ing that the defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts were suffi-
cient to establish general jurisdiction and, hence, the claim need not
“arise from” the defendant’s forum activity.24
Professor Patrick Borchers concluded, pre-Bauman and pre-Goodyear,
that such inappropriately expansive definitions of general jurisdiction
were acceptable because they offset inappropriately narrow definitions of
specific jurisdiction: “Given the restrictive and confused” elements of
current specific jurisdiction analysis, the lower courts’ broader conception
of general jurisdiction supplied “an imperfect safety valve that sometimes
allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific juris-
diction would deny it.”25 The Bauman Court eliminated this safety
valve.26 However, Bauman also provided space for courts to construe
19. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also Rhodes, supra note 5, at 409-
12.
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
21. E.g., Twitchell, supra note 4, at 625, 635-43; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
10, at 1141-44.
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 &
n.10 (1984); see also William M. Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; By Robert C.
Casad, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1338-41 (1984) (book review); Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638-
43 & n.144.
23. E.g., Twitchell, supra note 4, at 635-43; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at
1141-44.
24. E.g., Borchers, supra note 10, at 139; Stein, supra note 10, at 542 (acknowledging
and disparaging use of general jurisdiction “to fix inadequacies in specific jurisdiction”);
Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638-43.
25. Borchers, supra note 10, at 139; accord Twitchell, supra note 4, at 652, 676; Twitch-
ell, supra note 14, at 195-96.
26. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757-58 n.9 (2014) (indicating that spe-
cific jurisdiction has assumed a broader role and that general jurisdiction need no longer
extend more broadly to adjust for narrow formulations of specific jurisdiction) (citing von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1177-79; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 676; and
Borchers, supra note 10, at 139).
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specific jurisdiction more broadly and in a way that would encompass
many cases in which the litigation is only loosely related to the defen-
dant’s forum contacts, but jurisdiction would nevertheless be
reasonable.27
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions for eight members of the Court in Bauman
and for the unanimous Court in Goodyear foreshadow a broader range
for specific jurisdiction.28 The Court’s unanimous decision in the specific
jurisdiction case of Walden v. Fiore also contains broader language re-
garding specific jurisdiction.29 Walden confirmed that due process protec-
tion of personal jurisdiction is based on protecting the individual liberty
interest.30 It returned to the concepts of early post-International Shoe
cases by requiring concurrent examination of the “relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation”31—a hallmark of a reasonable-
ness analysis.32 Inexplicably, however, the Walden Court explored the re-
lation of the lawsuit to the forum for the sole purpose of identifying
contacts of the defendant to the forum.33 The Supreme Court has, thus,
used a reasonableness rationale to limit general jurisdiction and has made
strides toward the reasonableness approach for specific jurisdiction, but
Walden ultimately reunited the antagonistic theories of reasonableness
and state territorial power to limit the reach of specific jurisdiction.34
The Court has entered a new era of constrained general jurisdiction.
This era should also be characterized by broader specific jurisdiction. The
Court should continue Walden’s concurrent examination of the relation
of the lawsuit and the defendant to the forum. It should, however, deter-
mine specific jurisdiction by using a reasonableness analysis similar to the
analysis it has sometimes used in the past—one that requires a relation
between the defendant and the forum, but that also considers all connec-
tions of the lawsuit to the forum in determining the breadth of specific
jurisdiction as well as its outer limits.35
27. See generally Bauman at 746-62.
28. See infra notes 292-341, and accompanying text.
29. See 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
30. Id. at 1122, 1125 n. 9.
31. Id. at 1121 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
32. E.g., Graham C. Lilley, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA.
L. REV. 85, 90-91 (1983); Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contracts: The Supreme
Court’s New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19, 31, 33-34 (1980).
33. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-26 (considering defendant’s forum contacts, the relation
of the claim to the forum, the relation of the plaintiffs to the forum and to the defendant,
and the relation of the plaintiffs and defendant to the alternate forum of Georgia, but
viewing all factors in light of whether they revealed forum contacts by defendant).
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 102-127 and 256-271, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial
Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 434, 437-38,
451-54 (1981); Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 880, 897,
903 (2012); Heiser, supra note 10, at 923, 928-29; Lilley, supra note 32, at 113-16; Allan R.
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regu-
latory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 413, 417, 425-28 (2004); Twitchell, supra note 4, at
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In Section II, I discuss the transformation of personal jurisdiction, fol-
lowing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, from a jurisprudence based
on state territorial authority to a doctrine of reasonableness of the forum,
given the substantial connection of the litigation to the forum state.36
These cases support the specific jurisdiction analysis I ultimately advo-
cate. I then review the Court’s move, in Hanson v. Denckla and suc-
ceeding cases, away from that reasonableness approach and toward a
vision of specific jurisdiction as primarily protecting against forum state
encroachment on other states’ jurisdictional turf.37
In Section III, I discuss the Court’s recent general jurisdiction cases:
Daimler AG v. Bauman38 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown.39 These cases both narrow general jurisdiction and, in dicta, antic-
ipate a broader scope for specific jurisdiction. Section III also analyzes
Walden v. Fiore, the Court’s most recent specific jurisdiction case.40
Walden provides conflicting signals. In portions of the opinion, the Court
suggests a broader specific jurisdiction analysis, one based on the liberty
interest and on a reasonableness analysis that examines the relation
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, but the Walden Court
applied that approach in a constrained manner.41 It considered factors
relevant to a reasonableness approach, but it limited consideration to
whether each factor revealed forum contacts by defendant.42
Finally, in Section IV, I conclude that the Bauman and Walden Courts
correctly recognized personal jurisdiction as involving consideration of
the relatedness of the defendant and the litigation to the forum state. The
Court should now overtly adopt an approach similar to that sometimes
used in the past and to one the Court suggests in dicta in Bauman—an
analysis that considers, in a first step, whether the defendant or the epi-
sode-in-suit has at least a minimal connection with the forum. If so, in a
second step, the court would consider all relevant interests, including
those of the plaintiff, the defendant, and interested states, to determine if
asserting jurisdiction over the particular claim at issue would be reasona-
ble. In Section IV, I also offer some suggestions for application of that
approach in a manner that will impose appropriate limits on specific juris-
diction without resort to the fiction of territorial power or its surrogates,
purposeful availment and sufficiency of a defendant’s forum contacts.
646, 658-59, 662-63; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1166-76; Woods, supra note
16, at 880-93.
36. See infra notes 117-147, and accompanying text.
37. See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
38. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
39. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011).
40. See generally Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
41. Id. at 1120, 1122.
42. Id.
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II. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION: EXPANSION,
DECLINE, AND INDECISION
A state court may assert personal jurisdiction if the state has author-
ized the court to assert jurisdiction and if the court’s assertion of jurisdic-
tion accords with due process.43 To determine whether jurisdiction
satisfies the Due Process Clause, courts today examine whether the re-
quirements of specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction are met.44 Be-
cause the germinal work of Professors von Mehren and Trautman
identified the specific jurisdiction/general jurisdiction analysis, and be-
cause that article figures prominently in some of the Supreme Court’s
recent opinions and analysis, I begin with a brief discussion of that arti-
cle.45 In 1966, Professors von Mehren and Trautman surveyed American
case law regarding personal jurisdiction.46 They recognized two pre-ex-
isting types of personal jurisdiction that they labeled “general” and “spe-
cific” jurisdiction.47 Von Mehren and Trautman referred to jurisdiction
based solely on the defendant’s relationship to a forum state, without re-
gard to the matter in controversy, as “general” jurisdiction.48 They la-
beled jurisdiction based on “affiliations between the forum and the
underlying controversy” as “specific” jurisdiction.49 International Shoe
transformed the law of personal jurisdiction, they observed, because it
embraced a new analytical methodology that deemed specific jurisdiction
appropriate if the case at issue bore “a reasonable and substantial con-
nection to the forum.”50
Von Mehren and Trautman concluded that, to be consistent with the
Due Process Clause, general jurisdiction ought to be narrowly construed
because of its deep bite.51 When a court has general jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate, it may assert jurisdiction over any claim, related or not, to the defen-
dant’s forum contacts.52 American courts, however, developed a broad
interpretation of general jurisdiction in which (until the Court’s recent
43. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
44. Federal courts have broader personal jurisdiction than state courts, which are gov-
erned by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See generally Clermont, supra note 35,
at 427-28 & nn. 82-85. The limits of the federal court’s broader power is rarely explored
because, absent congressional legislation providing broader jurisdiction, federal courts
have limited their jurisdiction to that of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which
the federal court sits. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 753.
45. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754, 762 n.20 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 2857 n.5 (2011); J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797-98, 2804 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion in Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014),
did not reference the von Mehren and Trautman article, nor did Justice Kennedy in his
plurality opinion in Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785-2791.




50. Id. at 1147.
51. Id. at 1143-44, 1177-79.
52. Id. at 1136.
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decisions in Bauman53 and Goodyear54) they permitted general jurisdic-
tion in a corporate defendant’s state of incorporation or principal place of
business, and also in states in which the defendant had “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum.55 This ultimately meant that corpo-
rations having continuous and systematic contact with most or all states—
as many do—could be subjected to jurisdiction in every or almost every
state on any claim, related or not, to their activity in the state.
Von Mehren and Trautman had argued against such broad jurisdiction.
They concluded that general jurisdiction, which is based on a party’s rela-
tion to the forum, should be limited to forums in which a party had the
kind of “total, close, and continuing relations to a community implied in
incorporation or in the location of a head office within a state.”56 They
disparaged the tendency to construe a corporation’s “continuous” con-
tacts with a community to establish activities-based “general” jurisdiction
to hear all claims against the corporation.57 Conceding that such broad
notions of general jurisdiction were “understandable” when specific juris-
diction was “largely or completely unknown,” they contended that in the
post-International Shoe context, specific jurisdiction, rather than general
jurisdiction, ought to encompass jurisdiction premised on a defendant’s
continuous and systematic forum contacts.58
Von Mehren and Trautman acknowledged that the courts had, by 1966,
vastly increased specific jurisdiction, but they argued for continued ex-
pansion of the “more functional and less mechanical” approach of Inter-
national Shoe.59 They recommended that, when specific jurisdiction
matured, the courts’ analysis of the relatedness issue should include “the
relationship of the parties and of the controversy to the forum” and addi-
tional factors bearing on “litigational and enforcement” issues.60 In par-
ticular, they advocated for consideration of the following factors: (1) the
character of the defendant’s activity that led to the controversy, which
included the nature of the claim at issue; (2) whether the defendant was
“a corporation [ ]whose economic activities and legal involvements were
53. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
54. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 785 (2011). See also,
e.g., Stein, supra note 10, at 528, 545-48 (discussing Goodyear’s “apparent constriction of
general jurisdiction” and suggesting a method of assessing the limits of general jurisdiction
under the “essentially at home” standard).
55. E.g., Brilmayer et al., supra note 10, at 735-36, 741-723; Twitchell, supra note 14, at
182-89.
56. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1141-44, 1177-79.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1141-45, 1177-79; accord Twitchell, supra note 14, at 182-87 (noting that both
the language of International Shoe and subsequent Supreme Court cases require more than
“continuous and systematic” contact for general jurisdiction). The Supreme Court, in
Daimler AG v. Bauman, emphasized as well that International Shoe used the terms “con-
tinuous and systematic” to describe specific jurisdiction and that general jurisdiction re-
quires contacts that are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the corporation]
essentially at home in the forum.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851); see also id. at 761 & nn.17-19.
59. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1164.
60. Id. at 1166.
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pervasively multistate” or “a natural . . . person whose economic activities
and legal involvements were essentially local;” (3) whether the “defen-
dant’s activity foreseeably involved the risk of harm to individuals in
communities other than his own”; (4) whether the plaintiff was a nonresi-
dent, or whether “[the plaintiff’s] . . . affairs . . . were spread out over
several jurisdictions including the defendant’s home;” and (5) “litiga-
tional and enforcement” issues such as the convenience of witnesses and
ease of determining controlling law.61
Specific jurisdiction, however, did not experience the full extent of this
anticipated growth. Instead, the Supreme Court eventually construed
specific jurisdiction narrowly by requiring that a defendant must “pur-
posefully avail itself” to the forum state before specific jurisdiction would
be recognized.62 The Court did so, first, to protect “interstate federalism”
concerns, concluding that even if a forum would be a reasonable place to
litigate a particular controversy, “the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State
of its power to render a valid judgment.”63 It later concluded that pur-
poseful availment was necessary to give the defendant “clear notice” that
it could be subject to suit in the forum.64 The “clear notice” foundation
for purposeful availment has been repeatedly criticized because, among
other things, a defendant’s reasonable expectations must be based, in
part, on Supreme Court decisions regarding the extent of specific
jurisdiction.65
Lower courts also contributed to narrowing specific jurisdiction. They
often require, even when the defendant has sufficiently purposeful con-
tacts to clear the purposeful availment hurdle, that the claims at issue
61. Id. at 1164, 1166-69. Other commentators have also advocated consideration of the
relation of both the defendant and the lawsuit to the forum. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note
35, at 434, 437-38, 451-54; Effron, supra note 35, at 880, 897-98, 899-903; Lilley, supra note
32, at 113-16; Richman, supra note 22, at 1345; Woods, supra note 16, at 880-93; accord Lea
Brilmayer and Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues
Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63
S.C. L. REV. 617, 630-33 (2012) (reminding that the Due Process Clause protects plaintiffs
as well as defendants, and advocating for consideration, in appropriate cases, of the con-
tacts of each with the forum and comparison of the burdens on defendant in defending in a
distant forum with the burdens on the plaintiff in suing in a distant jurisdiction).
62. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-54 (1958); see also infra notes 156-180 and
accompanying text.
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (citing Han-
son, 357 US. at 254); see also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-54.
64. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
65. Id. at 312 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s reasoning regard-
ing purposeful availment and clear notice is circular because a defendant’s reasonable ex-
pectations about jurisdiction must include Supreme Court decisions regarding the extent of
jurisdiction); see also Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 93-94 (1990);
Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 61, at 623; Stein, supra note 35, at 418-19; Heiser, supra
note 10, at 923; Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 443-44 (1981). Commentators note as well that a
constitutional notice standard is inadequate if it “focuses only on the defendant’s conduct
and ignores other legitimate interests, such as those of the plaintiff and . . . state.” Heiser,
supra note 10, at 923; Jay, supra at 445-48.
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must “arise out of” the defendant’s forum conduct, rather than more
loosely “relate to” those contacts, thus preventing jurisdiction over claims
loosely related to defendant’s activity or impacts in the forum.66 The Su-
preme Court, moreover, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, noted this relatedness debate, but declined to resolve it.67 Plaintiffs
in Helicopteros had conceded their claims did not “arise out of” or “relate
to” the defendant’s forum activities and argued, instead, only based on
general jurisdiction.68 The Helicopteros Court, thus, declined to reach the
issue of whether “arising out of” or “related to” indicated “different con-
nections between a cause of action and a defendant’s contacts with a fo-
rum.”69 The Court has not subsequently resolved this issue.
Cases involving these “loosely” or “tenuously” related claims,70 moreo-
ver, had traits of both general and specific jurisdiction, but they were a
“near miss” on the “paradigm” instances of each.71 They often missed on
general jurisdiction because the defendant had substantial, often “contin-
uous and systematic” contact with the forum, but not enough to consti-
tute general jurisdiction.72 They also failed a paradigmatic specific
jurisdiction analysis because the claims might loosely or tenuously “relate
to” the forum contact or impact, but would not “arise out of” the con-
tact.73 Examples include (1) cases in which a defendant has purposeful
forum contacts but a physical injury loosely related to the contacts occurs
in another forum; and (2) cases in which a defendant has continuous busi-
ness contacts with a forum but never physically enters the forum.74 In a
recurrent exemplar, a nonresident defendant advertises in the forum, and
66. Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638- 39 (noting that state courts extended contacts-based
general jurisdiction to avoid making the difficult decisions regarding whether claims that
are loosely related to defendant’s forum contacts are within the scope of specific
jurisdiction).
67. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
68. Id. at 415 & n.10.
69. Id.
70. Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638-39, 648-49.
71. Richman, supra note 22, at 1337-39, 1343.
72. Richman, supra note 22, at 1342-43. This, of course, is a pre-Daimler AG v.
Bauman analysis. See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-58. After Bauman, these cases will often
not constitute even a “near miss” on general jurisdiction because instances of “continuous
and systematic” contacts will be analyzed primarily as cases of specific jurisdiction, which
require a claim to be sufficiently connected with the defendant’s forum contacts.
73. Richman, supra note 22, at 1342-43.
74. Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638. Professor Richman accurately observed that illus-
trative cases cannot provide an accurate picture of the whole:
[T]he variations and gradations are too numerous to catalogue. For instance,
some portion of the plaintiff’s claim might be closely connected with the de-
fendant’s forum contacts while another portion might be unconnected. Or
the plaintiff’s claim might arise from activities outside the forum that
breached a duty created by a relationship centered in the forum. Or the
plaintiff’s claim might arise from an extra-forum act of the defendant that
nevertheless is part of an on-going activity that is significantly connected to
the forum. It bears repetition; the variations seem endless.
Richman, supra note 22, at 1340-41 (citing the following cases, respectively, to illustrate the
examples provided: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143 (1976)).
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a plaintiff, having responded to the advertisement, is subsequently in-
jured in another state, but elects to sue in the plaintiff’s home state. The
plaintiff’s case may be loosely “related to” the defendant’s in-state adver-
tising—that advertising led the plaintiff to vacation at the defendant’s
out-of-state hotel—but the injury at the hotel might not be construed to
“arise out of” the advertising.75 In these cases, a pre-Bauman and pre-
Goodyear court might have examined specific jurisdiction and granted or
rejected jurisdiction based on the relatedness of the claim.76 Conversely it
might have used general jurisdiction to avoid the “relatedness” issue, and
it might have concluded that it could assert “general” jurisdiction based
on the defendant’s “continuous and systematic” in-state advertising.
Bauman now precludes assertion of general jurisdiction.
If combined with Supreme Court and lower court decisions, Bauman
could be construed to imply that the Due Process Clause permits only
two limited “paradigm” categories of personal jurisdiction: (1) “specific
jurisdiction,” when the defendant has at least minimal contacts with a
forum, the defendant has displayed sufficient purposeful availment, and
the claim “arises out of” the forum contacts;77 and (2) “general jurisdic-
tion,” which has been newly narrowed to include “a limited set of affilia-
tions with a forum . . . ‘in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home.’”78 Such an interpretation could prevent jurisdiction in many cases
in which the defendant has substantial connections with or impact in a
forum and jurisdiction would be both fair and reasonable, but the claim at
issue is only loosely “related to” those contacts.79
75. Twitchell, supra note 4, at 638 n.130.
76. See generally Victor N. Metallo, “Arise Out of” or “Related to”: Textualism and
Understanding Precedent Through Interpretatio Objectificata, “Objective Interpretation”—
A Four Step Process to Resolve Jurisdiction Questions Utilizing the Third Circuit Test in
O’Connor as a Uniform Standard, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 415, 426-45
(2011) (discussing the various tests used in circuit courts to determine whether claims
“arise out of” or are “related to” defendant’s forum contacts).
77. This would permit jurisdiction over the two exemplars of specific jurisdiction iden-
tified in International Shoe – when the defendant’s activity is “continuous and systematic”
and also “give[s] rise to the liabilities sued on” and when the defendant conducts activities
in the state and “the obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities in the
state.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319 (1945).
78. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54).
79. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 22, at 1336-46 (cautioning against limiting personal
jurisdiction to cases that fall within the paradigm instances of specific and general jurisdic-
tion and suggesting that personal jurisdiction should not be viewed as constituting two or
three discrete categories, but as forming a continuum model in which defendant’s contacts
and claim-relatedness would vary, and that, moreover, other factors would figure impor-
tantly, such as “defendant’s benefits from the forum, the foreseeability of the forum litiga-
tion, lack of inconvenience, and the defendant’s initiation of the relationship with the
forum”); see also Rhodes, supra note 5, at 430-31 (concluding, similarly, that the narrowing
of general jurisdiction after the Goodyear opinion, required that specific jurisdiction be
construed more expansively, but establishing further, that the Nicastro opinions did not
provide that necessary broadening of specific jurisdiction). Professors Rhodes and Robert-
son conclude that, after Bauman and Walden, courts should apply a two-tier specific juris-
diction analysis,” one that would permit “a looser relationship” between the forum, the
parties, and the case when the defendant has “continuous and systematic” forum contracts,
but would require a tighter connection between the forum and the case when the “defen-
dant’s relationship with the forum is isolated or sporadic.” Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes
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I interpret the Court’s decisions in Bauman and Goodyear to provide
space for the Court’s return to a specific jurisdiction analysis that permits
jurisdiction when connections between the defendant, the controversy,
and the forum state render jurisdiction reasonable. Moreover, in Walden
v. Fiore, the Court suggested a type of reasonableness analysis that privi-
leged, as in the early post-International Shoe cases, a “substantial connec-
tion” to the forum state and that emphasized the relationship to the
forum of both the defendant and the litigation.80 Importantly, Walden did
not limit its specific jurisdiction inquiry by asking first whether the defen-
dant had purposefully availed and whether the claim was related to those
contacts. Instead, the Walden Court considered simultaneously the fol-
lowing reasonableness factors: the relation of the defendant to the forum,
of the plaintiff to the defendant and the forum, and of the claim to the
forum.81 The Walden Court stopped short of a full reasonableness analy-
sis, however, because it viewed each factor only to determine if it re-
vealed contacts connecting the defendant to the forum.82
In Section II.A, I discuss International Shoe’s break from the territorial
power analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff83 and the Court’s application of a new
analysis focused on the reasonableness of the forum given the contro-
versy at issue. In Section II.B, I explore the jurisdiction-limiting approach
the Court later adopted (in pursuit of protection of “interstate federalism
interests”) in Hanson v. Denckla and succeeding cases, as well as the
Court’s fluctuating conclusions regarding the policy underlying personal
jurisdiction. I assume general familiarity with these cases and primarily
analyze the Court’s shifting conclusions regarding the policy underlying
personal jurisdiction and how that debate has impacted specific jurisdic-
tion analysis.
A. DOCTRINAL TRANSFORMATION—FROM PENNOYER
TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE
International Shoe has been construed to mark a doctrinal shift from
the state territorial power analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff to an analysis
based on reasonableness, thus ushering in the modern era of personal
jurisdiction analysis under the Due Process Clause.84 In fact, the language
and Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 207, 212, 235-37 & n. 19 (2014).
80. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121-22 (2014).
81. Id. at 1122.
82. Id. at 1124-26.
83. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
84. Jay, supra note 65, at 429-31, 473 (recognizing that International Shoe “seemed to
rest on an entirely different conceptual foundation” than Pennoyer v. Neff, and cataloguing
articles that so suggested, but concluding that International Shoe was in fact capable of dual
interpretations, one based on fairness concerns and another based on the closeness of the
defendant’s connection to the forum). See also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of
Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 257-62, 269-70, 350-58 (1990) (criticizing the
view that International Shoe made a strong break with the analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff and
concluding, instead, that International Shoe is a “paradigm-seeking” case that permits both
forward-looking and backward-looking analyses).
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of International Shoe is capable of competing constructions—one that
supports a reasonableness approach to personal jurisdiction and that keys
on both the relation of the litigation to the chosen forum and on fairness
to the litigants, and a second, narrower approach that privileges state ter-
ritorial authority in a manner akin to Pennoyer v. Neff.85 These are the
so-called “forward-looking” and “backward-looking” faces of Interna-
tional Shoe.86
Under Pennoyer, personal jurisdiction was based primarily on the pres-
ence of persons or property in the forum, on consent to jurisdiction, and
on domicile.87 Presence in the state triggered state court authority.88 If
the defendant were present in the state at the time of service of process,
the state had the power to assert in personam jurisdiction.89 If the defen-
dant’s property were present in the state, the territorial power analysis
permitted assertion of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction in appropriate
cases.90 Pennoyer’s emphasis on the physical presence of the person or
property in the forum state protected both the forum state’s “exclusive
. . . sovereignty” over persons and property in the forum and sister states’
“exclusive . . . sovereignty” over persons or property outside the forum.91
Thus, Pennoyer recognized and protected against a state’s attempt to ex-
85. E.g., Jay, supra note 65, at 429, 473-74. Professor Jay concluded that International
Shoe was capable of antagonistic interpretations and that cases after International Shoe had
followed each of the differing interpretations:
The [International Shoe] opinion itself was extraordinarily ambiguous. While
the controversy presented was easily resolved, the reasoning provided was
capable of exploitation by two rival camps. It was possible to view the case as
opening the way for a type of constitutional forum non coveniens, modified
to eliminate any non-principled bias toward one party or the other. Certainly
cases like McGee could be seen as endorsing this interpretation. On the other
side, International Shoe might have been taken as a mandate to continue
seeing the relation of the defendant to the forum as the basic concern of the
due process clause. Hanson was an example of this perspective.
Jay, supra note 65, at 473. See also. Kamp supra note 32, at 31 (noting that the International
Shoe standard “was subsequently subject to two different interpretations”: One interpreta-
tion, like McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), considered a number of factors,
including “the regulatory concerns of the state, the convenience of the parties, the location
of witnesses, the law to be applied, and the possible alternative jurisdictions.” The second
interpretation, in a manner similar to Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), required
that each defendant have “physical or business connections with the state”); Kogan, supra
note 84, at 257, 349-50, 353-54, 349-58 (construing International Shoe as a “paradigm-seek-
ing” case, that permits “highly abstract alternative” constructions—one of which is a
“backward-looking approach” that would accord with the “message of Pennoyer”, and the
other of which is a “forward-looking approach” that “focuses less on the mandate that
‘contacts’ must exist, . . . [and more on] fostering ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice’”); Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism
in Federalism: Shady Grove versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 948-49
(2012).
86. Kogan, supra note 84, at 350-58. See also Jay, supra note 65, at 473; Rhodes, supra
note 5, at 398-400.
87. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721-25, 733-36 (1877).
88. Id. at 721-25.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 721-29. See also Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARV. L. REV. 909, 916-18 (1960).
91. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721-23.
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ert “extraterritorial jurisdiction” over people or property that would both
“offend sister States and exceed the . . . limits of the [forum] State’s
power.”92 The territorial power analysis, however, never adequately ad-
dressed all issues of personal jurisdiction. Pennoyer, thus, immediately
recognized exceptions to the requirement that either person or property
be present in the forum.93 It specified that a state could determine the
status of its citizens with respect to nonresident defendants, which permit-
ted divorce actions in one spouse’s absence, and it permitted states to
require foreign business entities to appoint agents to be present for ser-
vice of process.94
Clashing with the desire to protect the territorial authority of the
states, however, was the states’ growing desire to provide forums for re-
sidents to redress injury in instances in which increasingly mobile individ-
ual defendants could cause injury in the forum and leave, and corporate
defendants (which increasingly carried on business in multiple forums)
could cause injury through the activity of corporate agents.95 To bridge
the gap between original, narrow views of corporate “presence” in a fo-
rum that underlay the in personam portion of Pennoyer’s jurisdictional
trilogy, courts, among other things, expanded the definitions of a corpora-
tion’s implied “consent” to suit and its “presence” in the forum.96 Both
eventually came to be premised on a corporation’s transaction of business
in the forum.97 Varied and complex case law developed regarding when a
corporation’s “doing business” would constitute implied consent to juris-
diction or corporate presence in the forum.98
As a counterpoint to this prevailing “doing business” analysis, Judge
Learned Hand proposed, in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,99 a “rea-
sonableness” analysis that would balance the inconvenience to the defen-
dant with fairness to the plaintiff.100 In Hutchinson, a forerunner to
92. Bauman v. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). Pennoyer’s territorial analysis never fully explained personal juris-
diction. Indeed, the Pennoyer Court hastened to catalogue exceptions that would permit a
reasonable doctrine of personal jurisdiction, including voluntary appearance of the defen-
dant; status of a state resident, which would permit divorce actions in one spouse’s ab-
sence; and a business entity’s appointment of an agent for service of process. See, e.g.,
Luther L. McDougal III, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1, 1-2 & n.5 (1982). The Court quickly supplemented these exceptions with
the fictions of “implied consent” and “presence” based on doing business in the state. Id.
93. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735-36.
94. Id. at 721-25, 734; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts—From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1958); Hazard, supra note 16, at 271.
95. E.g., Kamp, supra note 32, at 31-35; McDougal, supra note 92, at 2; Note, supra
note 90, at 917-18.
96. E.g., Clermont, supra note 35, at 414-16; Kurland, supra note 94, at 575-86; Note,
supra note 90, at 920-23.
97. Kurland, supra note 94, at 584; Note, supra note 90, at 920.
98. Kurland, supra note 94, at 584-85; Note, supra note 90, at 922-23.
99. 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
100. Hutchinson 45 F.2d at 141-42.
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International Shoe’s “reasonableness” analysis,101 Judge Hand also con-
tended that the fiction of corporate “presence” based on doing business
in the forum should be abandoned in favor of a standard that “puts the
real question”—“whether the extent and continuity of what [the corpora-
tion] has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring it
before one of its courts.”102
International Shoe, likewise, espoused a reasonableness analysis, hold-
ing that to subject a nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction,
due process required only that the defendant have “certain minimum
contacts” with the state, “such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”103 Inter-
national Shoe, however, presents two faces—one forward-looking face,
based on language that speaks in terms of reasonableness or fairness of
the forum based on the litigation at issue, and a second, backward-look-
ing face that privileges Pennoyer’s premise that state territorial authority
must be respected.104 In line with the forward-looking approach, the In-
ternational Shoe Court rejected analysis based on a corporation’s ficti-
tious “presence” in the forum, emphasizing that the inquiry was a
symbolic one that, in fact, required courts to determine whether in-state
acts of the corporate agent were “sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process.”105 To determine whether those demands were met, Interna-
tional Shoe continued, required analysis of whether the corporation’s
“contacts . . . with the state [rendered it] reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there.”106 Among the relevant considera-
tions, the Court noted, was “[a]n ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ . . . to
the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of
business.”107
International Shoe instructed also that jurisdictional decisions would
vary based on the extent and nature of the defendant’s contacts with the
forum and the relatedness of the litigation.108 The Court, thus, provided
several circumstances in which the jurisdictional decision might diverge
based on variations in the nature and extent of the defendant’s forum
contacts and the relatedness of the litigation, including instances of “sin-
gle or isolated” contacts, “continuous and systematic” contacts, and “sub-
stantial” contacts.109 These instances can be construed as looking
101. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (citing Hutchinson, 45
F.2d at 139, 141); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1977) (citing Hutchinson, 45
F2d. at 141). See also Note, supra note 90, at 923.
102. Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 141.
103. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
See also Kurland, supra note 94, at 589.
104. See supra notes 84- 86 and accompanying text.
105. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 317-318.
109. Those illustrations are as follows: (1) there would be jurisdiction if corporate activ-
ity in a forum is not only “continuous and systematic, but also give[s] rise to the liabilities
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backward toward Pennoyer’s protection of state territorial boundaries.
International Shoe emphasized, however, that the analysis was not to be
“mechanical or quantitative . . . a little more or a little less.”110 Instead, it
should “depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws.”111 In Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, the Court later summarized the analysis as requiring that a court ex-
amine the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on
which the rules of Pennoyer rest[ed].”112 But, again, the Shaffer opinion
was ambiguous. Shaffer included expansive statements of the scope of
personal jurisdiction, but it ultimately applied the language narrowly.113
International Shoe’s forward-looking approach suggested doctrinal
change from Pennoyer’s protection of state territorial authority to an
analysis privileging reasonableness under the circumstances. This frame-
work, which the Court used in cases immediately following International
Shoe, was necessarily accompanied by a change in underlying policy.
Whereas Pennoyer’s analysis was premised on safeguarding interstate
federalism interests, International Shoe’s reasonableness assessment pro-
tected the individual liberty interest.
B. APPLYING THE REASONABLENESS APPROACH—
INTERNATIONAL SHOE TO MCGEE
In its immediate post-International Shoe cases, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed specific jurisdiction using a reasonableness analysis. In three cases,
the Court based its analysis on the connectedness of the lawsuit to the
forum and, hence, whether it was fair to the parties to litigate in the cho-
sen forum.114 One can extract from these cases (as von Mehren and
Trautman did) the functional considerations that von Mehren and Traut-
man deemed critical to development of a “mature” specific jurisdiction
analysis regarding relatedness of the defendant and litigation to the fo-
sued on,” id. at 317; (2) there would not be jurisdiction based on the corporate agent’s
“single or isolated” acts when the suit is on “causes of action unconnected with the activi-
ties there;” however, in other instances, “single or occasional” acts “because of their nature
and quality and the circumstances of their commission [might] be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit,” id. at 317-18; (3) some “continuous corporate opera-
tions within a state [might be] . . . so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities,”
id. at 318; and (4) if the defendant had “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the state, there
would be no jurisdiction. Id. at 319.
110. Id. at 319.
111. Id., 319.
112. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
113. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 65, at 466 (noting that the Shaffer Court purported to
decide the case on the basis of a “fairness” inquiry, but ultimately defaulted to a “minimum
contacts approach” that “curtail[ed] discussion in favor of a dogmatic deference to
defendants”).
114. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Mullane v. Ctr. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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rum115—one that would ultimately permit the limitation of general juris-
diction to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of
business.116
The reasonableness inquiry of the early post-International Shoe cases
included assessment of the following factors: (1) the claim,117 the dollar
amount at issue, and the extent and nature of the defendant’s and plain-
tiff’s forum connections; (2) whether “economic activities” of the defen-
dant were at issue;118 (3) whether the defendant was a corporation or
individual, whether the defendant’s “economic activities and legal in-
volvements were pervasively multistate,” and whether the “defendant’s
activity foreseeably involved the risk of serious harm to individuals in
[other] communities”;119 (4) whether the plaintiff acted in a multistate or
local manner;120 (5) the comparative ease with which the defendant could
litigate in the forum and the plaintiff could litigate in the defendant’s
home state or other alternative forum;121 (6) the interests of the states at
issue; and (7) issues regarding efficient conduct of litigation.122
Combined, these factors indicated whether the litigation was suffi-
ciently connected with the forum to permit specific jurisdiction. They also
permitted a court to tailor the reasonableness of jurisdiction to the facts,
ensuring that the small, local defendant (for whom the Court expresses
continuing and appropriate concern) as well as the local plaintiff with a
small claim may each be treated fairly. Although it is difficult to create a
one-size-fits-all rule for all issues of personal jurisdiction, courts may,
from these considerations, fashion reasonable or fair outcomes for vary-
ing scenarios.123 The analysis would broaden specific jurisdiction in some
115. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1166-69 (relying on McGee v. Int’l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), Hess v. Pawloski, 79 U.S. 274 (1927), and on an article dis-
cussing the “phenomenon of an insurance company conducting a defense in a case such as
Hess v. Pawloski”).
116. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1179.
117. The McGee Court deemed it significant that the claim at issue was a small-dollar
claim by an insured against a nonresident insurer that refused to pay on a claim. McGee,
355 U.S. at 223. Travelers keyed on the state’s “interest in all insurance policies protecting
its residents,” Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950); and the Mullane
Court deemed it critical that the claim was for an accounting “to close trusts that exist by
the grace of [New York] laws and are administered under . . . its courts.” Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 313.
118. McGee, 335 U.S. at 223; Travelers, 339 U.S. at 645-46.
119. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24; Travelers, 339 U.S. at 646-47. See also Von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 10, at 1167-1168.
120. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1167-1168.
121. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; Travelers, 339 U.S. at 648-49.
122. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; Travelers, 339 U.S. at 648-49. See also Von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 10, at 1167-69.
123. Courts were, in fact, in the process of developing such reasonable outcomes before
the Supreme Court turned from this analysis in Hanson v. Denckla. See Note, supra note
90, at 925 (noting that, notwithstanding the variability of a reasonableness standard, courts
had, post-International Shoe, identified “recurring situations” in which foreign corpora-
tions would be subject to jurisdiction); accord Hazard, supra note 16, at 283 (suggesting
that the perceived vagueness of the reasonableness approach could be resolved by “arbi-
trary particularization,” which is exemplified by creation of classes of cases where jurisdic-
tion is appropriate under long-arm statutes).
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instances. The increase is warranted, however, in a world in which inter-
state travel and communication have become the rule, interstate eco-
nomic activity is the norm, and general jurisdiction has been narrowed.
In the first case, Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, defendant Trav-
elers, a Nebraska corporation, had entered into numerous insurance con-
tracts in Virginia without opening an office in the state or sending agents
into the state.124 Travelers typically obtained new Virginia members, in-
stead, through unpaid recommendations of existing Virginia members.125
These recommendations resulted in Travelers’ insurance certificates being
“systematically and widely delivered in Virginia.”126 Because it had no
office or agents in Virginia, Travelers declined to comply with Virginia
Blue Sky laws requiring registration of companies that sold insurance cer-
tificates in the state.127 When Virginia initiated a cease and desist action
regarding Travelers’ failure to register, Travelers argued lack of personal
jurisdiction.128
In a 5-4 decision, the Travelers Court held that the Due Process Clause
permitted personal jurisdiction.129 In so concluding, the Court examined
the nature of claim, the defendant’s conduct and interest, the state’s inter-
ests, the insureds’ interests, and various litigation-related factors.130 The
Court emphasized that the defendant had reached into the state of Vir-
ginia, admittedly without sending agents, and had “create[d] continuing
relationships” with numerous residents over a period of years.131 Moreo-
ver, the Court recognized a strong regulatory interest of the state in insur-
ance policies protecting its citizens and a strong interest of the state in
providing a forum for redress of injury, particularly since the claims at
issue would typically be too small to warrant the expense of suit in defen-
dant’s distant state of incorporation.132 Finally, the Court observed that
relevant witnesses and the claim investigation would most likely be in
Virginia.133
Thus, the Travelers Court noted a connection of the defendant and the
litigation to the state and, correspondingly, a strong interest of the state
in providing a forum for the suit.134 The Court also concluded that a com-
parative defendant-insured assessment favored requiring the defendant
to litigate in the chosen forum: The defendant had acted, in a multi-state
manner, to cultivate a pervasive and continuous presence that benefitted
124. Travelers, 339 U.S. at 645-46.
125. Id. at 646.
126. Id. at 646, 648.
127. Id. at 646-47.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 647-49. See Kurland, supra note 94, at 593 (concluding that Travelers re-
vealed a “thoroughly divided court” and that “[t]he vote on the merits was . . . five to four,
with one of the five feeling it necessary to file an opinion of his own”).
130. Travelers, 339 U.S. at 645-49.
131. Id. at 647.
132. Id. at 647-49.
133. Id. at 649.
134. Id. at 648.
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the defendant economically and that would from time to time result in
litigation, while the insureds had acted in a local manner and would typi-
cally pursue claims too small to warrant litigation in defendant’s home
state.135 Issues of efficient litigation also warranted suit in the state.136
The Travelers case parallels some contemporary cases of “loosely re-
lated” forum contacts in which the defendant creates a strong forum pres-
ence without entering the state or having agents in the state.
In a second case, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the
Court similarly balanced relevant interests of the state, defendant, and
plaintiff to determine the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdic-
tion.137 Mullane examined whether a New York court could, in a suit to
settle the accounts of a common trust fund established in New York, exert
jurisdiction over numerous nonresident defendants who were individual
beneficiaries of the trust.138 With little factual analysis, the Court bal-
anced the interests of the state, the plaintiff-trust company, the non-resi-
dent, and defendant beneficiaries and held that the Due Process Clause
permitted jurisdiction:
It is sufficient to observe that . . . the interest of each state in provid-
ing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are
administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and
rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts
to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident,
provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be
heard.”139
Finally, in McGee v. Int’l Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court deter-
mined in a unanimous decision that due process would permit suit against
a defendant that had only a single contact with the state—one that cre-
ated a “substantial connection” with the state.140 The Court did so with-
out creating categorical rules for “isolated” contact, but it did assess the
defendant’s single forum contact in light of other factors regarding the
relatedness of the litigation, or “episode-in-suit,” to the forum state.141 In
McGee, defendant International Life had issued a single reinsurance cer-
tificate to a California insured, which the insured accepted.142 Following
the insured’s death, his mother, Lulu B. McGee, obtained a judgment in
California requiring International Life to pay the proceeds of the policy
to her as the beneficiary.143 When Mrs. McGee attempted to enforce the
135. Id. at 648-49.
136. Id. at 649.
137. Mullane v. Ctr. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Clermont, supra note
35, at 416-17 (noting that the Mullane analysis is consistent with a fairness approach).
138. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309-11.
139. Id. at 313.
140. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
141. See generally. Id. at 223-24.
142. Id. at 221-22. The California insured originally purchased the life insurance from
Empire Mutual Insurance Company. International Life later assumed Empire Mutual’s
insurance obligations. Id. at 221.
143. Id. at 221.
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judgment in Texas, however, International Life objected to the California
court’s authority to enter judgment against it.144
The McGee Court upheld jurisdiction, considering it important that the
suit was “based on a contract which had a substantial connection with”
California, including that the contract was delivered in the state, the in-
sured paid the premiums from California, and the insured lived in Cali-
fornia until he died.145 In so deciding, the Court considered: (1) the
substantial connection of the insurance contract to the forum; (2) the
“manifest interest” of the state in providing effective redress when insur-
ance companies refuse to pay claims; (3) a comparison of defendant’s
ability to litigate in the chosen forum and plaintiff’s ability to litigate a
small-dollar claim in the defendant’s distant home; and (4) the crucial
witnesses that would be located in the insured’s state.146 In light of these
factors, the Court concluded, that any inconvenience to the defendant
would not approach a denial of due process.147
In these cases, the Court’s contextual analysis of the relation of the
controversy to the forum included assessment of the defendants’ contacts
with the state, the type of claim at issue, the relation of the plaintiff to the
forum, the states’ interests, whether the plaintiff or defendant were indi-
viduals or corporations, whether either acted in an interstate manner
while the other acted locally, and whether either acted for economic gain,
as well as litigation considerations. These inquiries “put[ ] the real ques-
tion” of whether it was reasonable, in the context of the lawsuit at issue,
to require the defendant to litigate in the chosen forum.148 The inquiries
both expanded the scope of specific jurisdiction (jurisdiction was availa-
ble in McGee based on defendant’s single forum contact)149 and estab-
lished the boundaries of specific jurisdiction based on the connectedness
of the litigation, the defendant, and the plaintiff to the forum. Jurisdiction
would not, for instance, be available under the Court’s analysis had the
McGee plaintiff moved to Oregon or Indiana and attempted to sue in her
new state of residence.150 Certainly, in such a scenario, the plaintiff would
144. Id.
145. Id. at 223.
146. Id. at 123-24.
147. Id. at 224. These are among the factors that Justice Ginsburg deemed important in
her dissenting opinion in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. V. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794-97,
2800-04 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and she suggested, in Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), would be important to the specific jurisdiction inquiry (citing Trav-
elers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)).
148. See Kurland, supra note 94, at 584.
149. Id. at 223-24.
150. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-77 (1984) (permitting ju-
risdiction in a forum in which plaintiff was a nonresident, but based on additional factors
including the defendant’s limited, but regular, business in the forum, multiple state inter-
ests, and litigation efficiency). See also Kurland, supra note 94, at 591 (recognizing that a
state of domicile is often “vitally interested in obtaining justice for its inhabitants,” but
asserting that use of plaintiff’s domicile or residence alone as a basis for personal jurisdic-
tion “would indeed be a startling innovation in Anglo-American jurisprudence,” and sug-
gesting that the factor probably must be combined with others to permit jurisdiction)
(quoting Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 437 (1929)); Jay,
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have a relation with the Oregon or Indiana forum and she would possess
the plaintiff’s ever-present desire to sue in her home forum. However, the
defendant would have no contact there, the contract would be unrelated
to the forum, California’s regulatory interests would not accompany the
plaintiff, and the litigation considerations regarding available witnesses
would not favor the forum.
In the wake of the McGee decision, some commentators contended
that the reasonableness analysis of International Shoe was ambiguous and
amorphous and would not impose sufficient limits on specific jurisdic-
tion.151 Others considered that the reasonableness analysis provided too
little protection for state territorial boundaries and interstate federalism
and thus, argued for giving primacy to the so-called “backward-looking
face” of International Shoe.152 Interestingly, the “amorphous” reasona-
bleness analysis would be replaced not with the certainty of the in per-
sonam/in-rem/quasi in rem analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff,153 but with an
equally amorphous analysis of quantity of contacts and sufficiency of
“purposeful availment.”154
C. RECONSIDERING THE MODERN ANALYSIS—HANSON V. DENCKLA
TO THE PRESENT
Just one year after its unanimous decision in McGee and a scant thir-
teen years after the International Shoe decision, however, a divided Court
reversed course and returned to an analysis that privileged “interstate
federalism” interests and protection of state territorial limits, i.e., the so-
supra note 65, at 463-64 (accepting that there may be no jurisdiction in a forum with no
relation to the defendant other than that the plaintiff chose to sue there, but suggesting
that usually the defendant does have some additional relation, though that may simply be
that the plaintiff’s move was foreseeable to the defendant, and, in such instances, the Court
should explain why there is no jurisdiction); but see McDougal, supra note 92, at 8-10, 13-
14, 26-31 (advocating an analysis that would permit jurisdiction based on a state’s interest,
including the interest in providing a forum for residents to bring suit, subject to defendant’s
showing that the forum would impose an undue burden); Kogan, supra note 84, at 367-71
(presenting a “mutual inconvenience” paradigm for personal jurisdiction that accords little
importance to state boundaries or sovereignty).
151. E.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 290-91; Hazard, supra note 16, at 283 (acknowl-
edging that a perceived “defect” of the reasonableness analysis was “vagueness . . . [that
could] make jurisdictional litigation uncertain at the trial level and frequent at the appel-
late level” but concluding that there would be recurring similar situations).
152. See Kamp, supra note 32, at 37-39; see also Kurland, supra note 94, at 569, 621-22.
153. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). And even that “certainty” is suspect, as courts, in the pre-
International Shoe era, found it necessary to create “[a] considerable body of case law . . .
setting forth many technical distinctions as to what constituted doing business” and, hence,
‘presence’ or ‘implied consent’ of a corporation to jurisdiction.” Note, supra note 90, at
922. See also supra note 92.
154. E.g., Clermont, supra note 35, at 446; Jay, supra note 65, at 463-64; Kamp, supra
note 32, at 44-45, 53 (observing that it is “impossible to answer in definite terms” what
minimal number of contacts is required; that the Court has created a “mathematical mo-
rass;” and that the “Court’s analysis leads to greater uncertainty”). The Court’s decision in
Walden v. Fiore reflects the ambiguity of a “sufficiency of contacts” approach, as the Court
considered factors that might tie the controversy to the forum but ultimately concluded,
with no explanation for its decision, that the defendant had no meaningful contacts with
the state. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124-26 (2014).
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called “backward-looking face” of International Shoe.155 The Court ulti-
mately protected interstate federalism interests by requiring a narrowly
focused inquiry into the defendant’s purposeful availment and the suffi-
ciency of defendant’s forum contacts.156
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court concluded that personal jurisdiction
protects both liberty interests and state territorial interests.157 One of the
interests had to take precedence, however, and the Hanson Court ele-
vated protection of interstate federalism interests.158 In a display of per-
haps unparalleled indecision (or disagreement), the Court has reversed
course on this issue multiple times.159 Moreover, the decision on underly-
ing policy matters. To protect against forum state intrusion on the inter-
ests of sister states, Hanson introduced a one-dimensional requirement
that a defendant must “purposefully avail[ ] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”160 It also concluded that the “unilateral activity
of those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant can-
not satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum,”161 thus minimiz-
ing the importance of a plaintiff or other person’s connection to or
interest in a forum.162 Purposeful availment alone, however, is not an ac-
curate measure of a defendant’s connection to or impact in a forum, and
it is not functionally tied to any articulated interest of the forum state or
other states. As used by the Court, purposeful availment also reintro-
duced the “power” analysis of Pennoyer, providing a first-step inquiry
that often precludes specific jurisdiction based on a state’s lack of
“power” over the defendant before a court may even reach the second-
step reasonableness analysis of the early post-International Shoe cases.163
155. See supra notes 84-86, and accompanying text.
156. Some scholars have concluded that purposeful forum contacts can be viewed as the
new “presence” in the forum, but that purposeful forum contacts is insufficiently tied to
values that personal jurisdiction ought to protect. E.g., Clermont, supra note 35, at 445-47;
Jay, supra note 65, at 474-75; Kogan, supra note 84, at 351-53; Lilley, supra note 32, at 93,
108.
157. Hanson stated as follows:
[R]estrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’
with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 255 (1958).
158. See generally, id. at 251-54.
159. See infra notes 160-214, and accompanying text.
160. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
161. Id.
162. E.g., Rhodes, supra note 5, at 402-04.
163. E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980). See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at
251-52 (failing to find purposeful availment, and, thus, concluding the analysis with a find-
ing of no minimum contacts by the defendant at issue). Accord Jay, supra note 65, at 474-
75; Kamp, supra note 32, at 20-21, 29, 39-44; Rhodes, supra note 5, at 406.
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The Hanson Court assessed Florida’s authority to assert in personam
jurisdiction over a Delaware trust company that sent trust income to and
“carried on several bits of trust administration” with Florida domiciliary,
Dora Browning Donner.164 Mrs. Donner had created the trust while liv-
ing in Pennsylvania and had named the Delaware trust company as trus-
tee.165 She later moved to Florida.166 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that jurisdiction over the trust in Florida state court was not consonant
with due process because the trust had not “purposefully avail[ed] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and privileges of its laws.”167 Unilateral action by the
Florida settlor would not satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts by
the trust.168 Absent purposeful, forum-directed action, the defendant
trust company could have no “contact” with Florida, and thus lacked the
“minimum contacts” essential to personal jurisdiction.169
The Hanson decision initiated two changes that restricted a court’s au-
thority to assert personal jurisdiction. First, Hanson emphasized that the
Due Process Clause serves interstate federalism interests as well as lib-
erty interests, and it imposed “territorial limitations” on the power of
states, even if asserting jurisdiction would be entirely fair to the defen-
dant.170 If a defendant did not purposefully avail itself to the forum, thus
receiving the benefits and privileges of forum law, it had no contacts with
the forum that a court could recognize.171 Absent minimum contacts, no
analysis of other connections of the litigation to the state was war-
ranted.172 Thus, the reasonableness analysis of International Shoe’s for-
ward-looking construction bowed to interstate federalism interests.
Second, through the purposeful availment requirement,173 Hanson ele-
vated the importance of the quantum of the defendant’s forum contacts,
and it redefined the type of contact necessary to establish “minimum con-
164. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238-40, 246, 250 (1958). The Court also held that there was no
basis for in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 246-59.
165. Id. at 238-39.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 251-53 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945), but
failing to acknowledge that International Shoe anticipated that, in the absence of “con-
tacts,” the broader “ties[ ] or relations” with the forum state could suffice).
168. Id. at 253.
169. Id. at 253-54.
170. Id. at 251, providing as follows:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that [the] trend [to a more flexible analysis of
personal jurisdiction under International Shoe] heralds the eventual demise
of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts . . . . Those re-
strictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or dis-
tant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitation on the power
of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a for-
eign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had
the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of
power over him.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 253-54.
172. See id. at 254.
173. See id. at 253-54.
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tacts.” After Hanson, the Court’s cases take on much more of the quanti-
tative, mechanical, “a little more or a little less” analysis disparaged in
International Shoe.174 Hanson seemed to render a defendant’s purposeful
availment a prerequisite to jurisdiction and to devalue consideration of
the relation of the lawsuit to the forum, and hence, the interests of vari-
ous states, the plaintiff, and other litigation considerations.175 Subsequent
cases confirmed this.176 The Court ultimately acknowledged that the
“reasonableness” factors constituted part of the due process inquiry.177
Those factors included factors considered important in the court’s early
post-International Shoe cases—the forum state’s interest, the plaintiff’s
interest in convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s
interest in efficient resolution of cases, and shared state interests in “fur-
thering fundamental substantive social policies.”178 Though the precise
relation of the purposeful availment/minimum contacts analysis to the
“reasonableness” or “fairness” factors remains ambiguous,179 the Court
has employed a two-part minimum contacts and reasonableness analysis,
in which purposeful availment and minimum contacts are generally a pre-
requisite to reaching the reasonableness analysis.180
Since Hanson, the Court has continued to debate whether the Due
Process Clause protects individual liberty interests, interstate federalism
interests, or both, and, correspondingly, to revisit the relation of the pur-
poseful availment/minimum contacts analysis to the “reasonableness” or
“fairness” factors. In its 1980 decision in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, a divided Supreme Court confirmed that the due process re-
174. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
175. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
176. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-79 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980).
177. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.
178. See infra notes 386-87, and accompanying text.
179. Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of General Ju-
risdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1040-42 (2004) (referring to the following factors as
central in determining whether “personal jurisdiction is ‘reasonable’” and part of as the
“reasonableness inquiry”: “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s  inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interests of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies”) (internal quoting
omitted); Woods, supra note 16, at 890 (referring to similar factors “fairness factors”). Pro-
fessor Kamp acknowledged that the “factors” are primarily drawn from prior Supreme
Court cases. Kamp, supra note 32, at 39-40, 43.
180. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78; World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291-92. But see
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 111-112, 116 (O’Connor, J.) (including portions of an
opinion written for a plurality and portions written for the Court), and id. at 116-22 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (disagreeing on the purposeful
availment/minimum contacts analysis, but reaching the fairness analysis and concluding
that jurisdiction would not be reasonable on the facts at issue). Daimler AG v. Bauman,
however, in dicta, proposes a modified two-part test in which the first step would be to
assess “whether the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify . . .
jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014). Walden v. Fiore also
minimizes “purposeful availment,” but focuses on a threshold requirement of minimum
contacts by defendant. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
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quirement of “minimum contacts” both protected a liberty interest and
ensured that states would not assert jurisdiction “beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem.”181 The World-Wide Court analyzed whether a New York retailer
and its regional distributor could be required to submit to jurisdiction in
Oklahoma regarding an accident in Oklahoma, but involving a vehicle
sold to plaintiff in New York.182 Neither the dealer nor the distributor
sold cars in Oklahoma.183 The Court again privileged protection of inter-
state federalism interests.184 It found no purposeful availment and, thus,
concluded that defendants had “no contacts, ties, or relations” with the
forum.185 The lack of contacts precluded further analysis, but the Court
explained that, in appropriate cases, a court would also consider the rea-
sonableness factors, including those relating to the interests of the state
and the plaintiff.186
Two years later, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites de Guinee, the Court again reconsidered.187 It concluded that
personal jurisdiction protects only “an individual liberty interest.”188 It
“restrict[s] . . . judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty.”189 The Court also concluded that the Due
Process Clause is “the only source of the personal jurisdiction require-
ment and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns,”190
but the Court thereafter preserved a federalism focus, concluding that the
restriction on state sovereign power is “ultimately a function of the lib-
erty interest.”191 Still later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,192 the justices failed to muster a majority on the issue of whether
the forum-directed conduct of a foreign manufacturer of component
parts, in a stream of commerce case, was sufficient to constitute pur-
181. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
182. Id. at 288-89.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 293-94.
185. Id. at 294 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
186. Id. at 292. The factors include “the burden on the defendant, . . . the forum State’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute, . . . the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies.” Id.
187. 456 U.S. 694, 700 (1982).
188. Id. at 702.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 702 n. 10.
191. The Court also stated as follows:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individ-
ual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns.
Id.
192. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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poseful availment.193 The disagreement demonstrated continuing differ-
ences regarding whether the Due Process Clause, in the personal
jurisdiction context, protects primarily interstate federalism interests or
individual liberty.
The Court continues to debate the purpose of due process protection of
personal jurisdiction. In the 2011 case of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro,194 the Court returned a fractured 4-2-3 decision that exposed a
continuing deep divide regarding the policies underlying personal juris-
diction and, thus, whether to favor an analysis closer to the forward-look-
ing interpretation of International Shoe or closer to the policies and
doctrine underlying Pennoyer v. Neff.195 Justice Kennedy, writing for a
four-member plurality, returned overtly to the concepts of sovereignty
that informed the Pennoyer v. Neff analysis.196 Justice Kennedy stated
that personal jurisdiction is “a question of [state] authority rather than
fairness.”197 Conceding that personal jurisdiction confines judicial power
“‘not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,’”198
the plurality nonetheless emphasized that no judgment can be “lawful”
unless the “sovereign has authority to render it.”199 Justice Kennedy,
thus, determined that “the sovereign” states must have power to exercise
personal jurisdiction and, in line with Pennoyer, contended that the de-
fendant must “submit” to the power of a state for personal jurisdiction to
be valid.200 The defendant could do so in several ways—through express
consent; presence within the state at the time of service of process; incor-
poration or principal place of business in a state; or by “limited” submis-
sion through a defendant’s purposeful availment of the privilege of
conducting activities in a forum, and, in this scenario, only for sufficiently
related claims.201
193. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(concluding that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more,
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State” and requiring
additional conduct by the defendant that would reveal “an intent to serve the market in the
forum State”), with id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(concluding that no more is required than that “a participant [in the stream of commerce]
is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State” and that, in these
circumstances, suit in the form state is neither a surprise nor a burden unrelated to a forum
benefit). See also id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(suggesting that the purposeful availment inquiry consider “the volume, the value, and the
hazardous character of the components”).
194. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783 (2011).
195. 95 U.S. 714, 736 (1878); see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing
the forward-looking interpretation of International Shoe as supporting an analysis that ex-
amined the reasonableness of the forum and its backward-looking face as emphasizing the
closeness of defendant’s relation to the forum).
196. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798-91 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
198. Id. (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
199. Id. at 2786-87, 2789.
200. Id. at 2787.
201. Id. at, 2787-88 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the three dissenting justices, argued to the
contrary that limits on the personal jurisdiction of state courts protect
“‘individual liberty interests,’” not notions of sovereignty or power.202
Justice Ginsburg reemphasized that the critical inquiry is “[t]he relation-
ship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’”203 and she un-
derscored that Supreme Court precedent does not support the consent
theories endorsed by the plurality.204 In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Ginsburg applied a reasonableness analysis similar to the analysis used by
the Supreme Court in its early post-International Shoe cases to conclude
that the defendant at issue should be subject to specific jurisdiction.205 In
so doing, Justice Ginsburg also used factors that von Mehren and Traut-
man predicted would be considered important when the Court had devel-
oped a mature specific jurisdiction analysis—the type of claim at issue;
the relative burden to plaintiff and defendant in defending in the chosen
forum or an alternative forum; whether the parties were individuals or
corporations; whether either acted locally or in a pervasively multi-state
manner and for economic or other gain; and issues of litigation conve-
nience.206 Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion in which he avoided
aligning with either the analysis of Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion or
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.207 His opinion created an opaque
middle ground. He specifically registered disagreement with the analysis
of Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion and contended, instead, that the
Nicastro case was easily decided under “our precedents,” but he also
sided with the plurality to conclude that the defendant was not subject to
personal jurisdiction.208
202. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ins. Corp of Ireland, 456 U.S. at
102).
203. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
204. Id. at 2799.
205. Id. at 2794-97, 2800-04 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded that jurisdiction was reasonable in the state where the plaintiff was injured by the
foreign defendant’s allegedly defective product on the facts at issue, where (1) the defen-
dant was a corporation that treated the United States as a single, national market; (2) the
defendant targeted the United States as a whole by seeking to sell products “anywhere in
the United States”; (3) the defendant purposefully engaged a domestic distributor to sell
products in any state and attended regular product exhibitions in American cities; and (4)
the plaintiff was a local actor injured at his jobsite while using defendant’s product. Id. at
800-04. See also Clermont, supra note 35, at 439-41, 451-55; Effron, supra note 35, at 871-
72, 892, 898-903 (advocating an enhanced focus on the relation of the lawsuit to the forum,
rather than solely on the defendant’s relation to the forum, and concluding that Justice
Ginsburg’s focus on the relation of the suit in fact filed by the injured plaintiff to the forum
state at issue would appropriately limit the permissible forums); Lilley, supra note 32, at
113-15 (suggesting that the Court should permit jurisdiction when the defendant could
have reasonably foreseen the development of an affiliating link with the forum and the
forum is also reasonable); Twitchell, supra note 4, at 658-64, 679-80. See also supra notes
115-147 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of the reasonableness analysis in
the post-International Shoe period.
206. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800-04 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at
1166-79).
207. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 2791-94 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
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Finally, both of the Supreme Court’s 2014 personal jurisdiction opin-
ions discuss the purposes underlying due process protection of personal
jurisdiction.209 Conspicuously absent in each is the territorial power and
submission theory of the Nicastro plurality.210 Instead, in Daimler AG v.
Bauman, Justice Ginsburg, in an opinion in which seven other justices
joined, stated several times that the restrictive “territorial approach” of
Pennoyer v. Neff has “yielded to a less rigid understanding” and that spe-
cific jurisdiction has been “cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway.”211 In Walden
v. Fiore, a unanimous Court indicated that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects a liberty interest, but the Walden Court seemed anxious to qualify
its conclusion: “Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority
principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the con-
venience of plaintiffs or third parties.”212 Of equal importance, both
Bauman, in a general jurisdiction case, and Walden, in a specific jurisdic-
tion case, stated that a court examining specific jurisdiction must consider
“‘the relationship among the defendant, the litigation, and the fo-
rum.’”213 The Bauman analysis elevates the importance of the contro-
versy to the forum and backs away from a unilateral focus on the relation
of the defendant to the forum,214 but the Walden Court qualifies its ad-
vances. Walden examines the relation of the plaintiff and the litigation to
the forum, but limits consideration of each factor to a one-dimensional
inquiry regarding whether that factor reveals defendant’s contacts with
the forum.215
What to make of the Court’s shifting perspectives on the purposes ani-
mating personal jurisdiction? First, it’s unlikely that the Court has spoken
its last on the issue. Second, the Bauman and Walden opinions signal con-
tinued recognition of the individual liberty interest as the primary policy
underlying personal jurisdiction,216 but Walden, with no principled expla-
nation, also indicates a desire to privilege the defendant’s interests.217
Third, even if the Court later concludes that both an individual liberty
209. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121-22 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 753-58 (2014).
210. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123. Walden v. Fiore, however, dealt with alleged intentional
conduct, and the Nicastro plurality twice noted that a defendant’s alleged intentional mis-
conduct might be an exception to the general requirement that a defendant must submit to
the sovereign’s authority. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785, 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
211. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 753-54, 757-58.
212. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122, 1125 n.9.
213. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
775 (1984)) Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 757-58.
214. See infra notes 281 and accompanying text. Likewise, many commentators advo-
cate a greater focus on the relation of the lawsuit to the forum. See, e.g., Brilmayer &
Smith, supra note 61, at 630-32; Clermont, supra note 35, at 439-41, 451-55; Effron, supra
note 35, at 897-903; Heiser, supra note 10, at 923, 928-29; Lilley, supra note 32, at 108, 113-
15; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 646-47, 658-59, 662-63. See also Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v.
Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of Procedural Due Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV.
343, 350-52 (2007); Woods, supra note 16, at 890-898, 905.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 1122-25; Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760-61.
217. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-23.
2015] The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction 135
interest and an interstate federalism interest underlie personal jurisdic-
tion, the unadorned “purposeful availment” requirement is insufficiently
connected to interests of other states or the forum state to serve as an
adequate proxy for those interests. Moreover, retaining purposeful avail-
ment as an initial prerequisite would also preclude exploration of the
‘“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”’ that
Bauman and Walden endorse.218 Fourth, Bauman and Walden provide
room for courts to return to a more textured analysis of relevant interests,
one that would explore the relation of both the defendant and the lawsuit
to the forum. Walden, however, limits examination of factors regarding
the relation of the lawsuit to the forum by asking only whether they re-
veal defendant’s contacts to the forum.219 Walden’s omission of an inter-
state federalism premise for personal jurisdiction, however, results in an
opinion that provides little explanation for favoring primarily the single
interest of the defendant.220 In the succeeding Sections, I explore the
Bauman, Goodyear, and Walden opinions and advocate for an appropri-
ate reasonableness analysis.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT BAUMAN, GOODYEAR,
AND WALDEN
A. BAUMAN AND GOODYEAR: A RESTORED NARRATIVE REGARDING
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions for eight justices in Bauman and for the
unanimous Court in Goodyear put the reasonableness analysis of Interna-
tional Shoe’s forward-looking interpretation front and center again—a
position it has arguably not held since the Court’s decision in Hanson v.
Denckla.221 In these opinions, Justice Ginsburg acknowledges Interna-
tional Shoe as “canonical,” and, in each, her analysis begins with and cen-
ters on International Shoe.222
Although the Court confesses International Shoe as canonical in
Bauman and Goodyear, the International Shoe opinion seems—by most
definitions—to have lost any such elevated status in the progression of
the Court’s case-by-case, fact-specific development of personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine and particularly in light of the Hanson v. Denckla decision
218. Id. at 1123 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168, 204 (1977)); Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. at 754 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204).
219. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
220. See infra notes 380-82 and accompanying text.
221. 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958); but see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-91 (1984);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
222. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)). Further, in both the unanimous Goodyear decision and in
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro, Justice Ginsburg referenced International Shoe as
“pathmarking” and relied on it to guide analysis. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794-95 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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and subsequent cases.223 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines “canonical,” in part, as “like or conforming to a general rule [;]
accorded wide acceptance [;] sanctioned, orthodox, authoritative.”224 The
“pedagogical or teaching canon” in constitutional law has been defined as
“those cases and materials . . . that are regularly taught and read in consti-
tutional law courses, or that should be regularly taught and read in those
courses.”225 Under that standard, Professor Erbsen has observed that
personal jurisdiction has been exiled from the constitutional canon.226
Perhaps it could make a return. Indeed, Bauman suggests a return, in the
specific jurisdiction context, to a reasonableness analysis similar to that
used pre-Hanson that would examine the relatedness of both the transac-
tion and the defendant to the forum.227 Walden also endorses analysis of
the relation of the litigation and the defendant to the forum, but it trun-
cated that analysis.228 A renewed focus on the reasonableness of the fo-
rum could parallel due process protection of the constitutional notice
requirement and of procedural due process.229
But even solely within the study of personal jurisdiction, the reasona-
bleness analysis of International Shoe’s forward-looking approach ceded
its authoritative position to Hanson v. Denckla and subsequent cases fo-
cusing on territorial authority. Bauman suggests revitalization of Interna-
tional Shoe’s focus on the reasonableness of the forum.230 Justice
Ginsburg’s opinions in Bauman and Goodyear confirm restrictions on
223. See supra notes 157-72, and accompanying text for a brief discussion of Hanson
and its impact on personal jurisdiction analysis from 1958 through the 2011 decision in
Nicastro.
224. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, 328 (Philip Babcock Cove & The Merriam-Webster Editorial
Staff eds., 2002).
225. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canon of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 1003 (1998).
226. Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 72-74 (2010) (suggesting
that framing personal jurisdiction issues in the context of broader constitutional debates
would influence “how judges and lawyers understand and shape the issue”).
227. See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62.
228. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-25. See Lilley, supra note 32, at 108 (recognizing
that, in some cases, the Court’s focus on the defendant’s forum contacts has made its pur-
ported analysis of the “relation among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” little
more than “a hollow refrain”).
229. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 214, at 349-50 (suggesting that the reasonableness
factors – “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the interest forum State’s interest in adjudicating
the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the inter-
state judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’
and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies’”—parallel the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976),
“recast for the issue of the choice of a state forum,” and indicating that the requirement of
a defendant’s “purposeful, claim-related contacts” should be “jettisoned or at least consid-
erably relaxed”); Clermont, supra note 35, at 416, 438, 451 (concluding that the immediate
post-International Shoe cases provided that “one should ask whether jurisdiction was rea-
sonable in view of all the interests involved,” including those of “the public, the plaintiff,
and the defendant” and proposing a return to an analysis based primarily on “fundamental
[ ] fair[ness] in light of all the interests of the public and the parties concerning the litiga-
tion”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 79, at 236.
230. See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
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general jurisdiction, but they also suggest a broader scope for specific ju-
risdiction.231 Indeed, before addressing the particular general jurisdiction
issue presented, each opinion reads like a hornbook on the law of general
and specific personal jurisdiction. This is encouraging because commenta-
tors have repeatedly concluded that “[m]uch of the problem in defining
the scope of general jurisdiction stems from the fact that it is inextricably
linked with specific jurisdiction.”232
1. Bauman and Goodyear:  A More Limited Scope for General
Jurisdiction
In Daimler AG v. Bauman,233 the Court considered whether continu-
ous and systematic contacts with the state of California by a wholly
owned subsidiary of Daimler AG (Daimler) could be imputed to Daimler
for the purposes of establishing general jurisdiction over Daimler in Cali-
fornia.234 The procedural facts are somewhat complex. Daimler was a
German stock company with headquarters in Stuttgart. It manufactured
Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany.235 Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes
Benz-USA, LLC (MBUSA), was a Delaware limited liability corporation
with its principal place of business in New Jersey.236 Plaintiffs hoped to
establish that MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in California
based on its “continuous and systematic” California contacts.237 Those
contacts included that MBUSA was Daimler’s exclusive importer and dis-
tributor in the United States and that MBUSA also had a number of
California facilities.238 These included “a regional office in Costa Mesa, a
Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine.”239
MBUSA was also California’s “largest supplier of luxury vehicles,” and
“over 10% of” new sales of Mercedez-Benz cars in the United States
were in California.240 These sales in California constituted 2.4% of
Daimler’s total sales worldwide.241
Based on MBUSA’s “continuous and systematic” contacts in Califor-
nia, plaintiffs alleged that MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in
California.242 They argued further that the general jurisdiction of subsidi-
ary MBUSA should be attributed to Daimler.243 From there, Daimler
231. See id. at 760-62; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
232. E.g., Borchers, supra note 10, at 120; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 675.
233. 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-51 (2014).
234. Plaintiffs originally filed suit against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft. That en-
tity was restructured in 2007 and is currently known as Daimler AG. Id. at 750-51 n.2.
235. Id. at 750-51.
236. Id. at 751.
237. Id. at 751, 752.
238. Id. at 752.
239. Id. at 752.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Plaintiffs also attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction over Daimler based on
its presence in California, but did not appeal the district court’s denial of general jurisdic-
tion based on those contacts. Id. at 752, 758.
243. Id. at 752.
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should, under principles of general jurisdiction, be subject to suit in Cali-
fornia for unrelated conduct in Argentina of another subsidiary.244 The
Bauman Court held that general jurisdiction was not available because
(1) neither Daimler nor MBUSA had its state of incorporation or princi-
pal place of business in California;245 and (2) “continuous and system-
atic” conduct (which, the Bauman Court concluded, generally will define
specific rather than general jurisdiction) of Daimler in California did not
arise to the level at which Daimler could be considered “essentially at
home” there, even assuming that MBUSA’s activities could render
MBUSA at home in California and assuming also that the activities could
be attributed to Daimler.246
The Bauman opinion makes two primary assertions about general juris-
diction. First, the Court confirmed the “dispute-blind”/ “dispute-specific”
differentiation between general and specific jurisdiction.247 Second,
Bauman defined more precisely and narrowly the metaphorical “essen-
tially at home” standard for contacts-based general jurisdiction.
a. General Jurisdiction Is “All-Purpose” or “Dispute-Blind”
In the 1980s, Professor Twitchell reprised the analysis of Professors von
Mehren and Trautman regarding the distinction between personal juris-
diction labeled “general” and that labeled “specific.”248 “General” juris-
diction, Twitchell reminded, is “based on the affiliations between the
forum and one of the parties without regard to the nature of the dis-
pute.”249 “Specific” jurisdiction, by contrast, is “based on affiliations be-
tween the forum and the controversy.”250 A court, thus, exercises general
or “dispute-blind” jurisdiction if jurisdiction is exercised without regard
to the type of claim or dispute at issue.251 It asserts specific jurisdiction or
“dispute-specific” jurisdiction if “jurisdiction [is] based in any way on the
nature of the [claim presented].”252
In 2011, the Goodyear Court emphatically affirmed the “dispute-blind”
concept of general jurisdiction and, correspondingly, a “dispute-specific,”
or in the Goodyear Court’s terminology, a case-linked or controversy-
244. Id. at 758-59. Plaintiffs alleged that the predecessor to Mercedes-Benz Argentina
(MB Argentina), an Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, collaborated in the “kidnap, de-
tention, torture, and” killing of employees of MB Argentina during the “Dirty War” in
Argentina, from 1976-1983. Id. at 750-51.
245. Id. at 760-62 nn.19-20.
246. Id. at 760-62 (concluding that Daimler’s “slim contacts with [California would]
hardly render it at home there,” even if the Court assumed that MBUSA were at home in
California and that MBUSA’s California contacts could be attributed to Daimler).
247. See id.




251. Id. at 613.
252. Id.
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linked vision of specific jurisdiction,253 which supports a more expansive
reach for specific jurisdiction. The Goodyear Court also emphasized that
factors related to the litigation—including the nature of the claim and
interests of the plaintiff and the forum state—may bolster assertions of
specific jurisdiction, but not general jurisdiction.254
Bauman similarly reaffirmed the dispute-blind/dispute-specific differ-
entiation used in Goodyear,255 recognizing that general jurisdiction is
“all-purpose jurisdiction,” while specific is “conduct-linked” and “train[s]
on the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion.’”256 Bauman also indicated a broader scope for specific jurisdiction,
stating that specific jurisdiction is at issue when “the suit ‘arise[s] out of
or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”257 Further, in
articulating the two-part standard for specific jurisdiction, Bauman omit-
ted a “purposeful availment” requirement (as did Walden v. Fiore),258
and posited, in dicta, that the first step is to determine “whether the con-
nection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction.”259 This reliance on a minimum connection
between the episode at issue and the forum state is decidedly closer to the
reasonableness analysis of McGee than to Hanson’s almost exclusive fo-
cus on the relationship among the defendant and the forum.260
The more expansive articulation of specific jurisdiction arises from the
Bauman Court’s acceptance of the corollary of Professor Twitchell’s con-
tention that general jurisdiction be construed more narrowly to include
253. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850-51, 2855-
56 (2011).
254. Id. at 2855. Goodyear stressed that the following issues related to the controversy
at issue could be used to bolster a claim of specific jurisdiction, but not general jurisdiction:
(1) plaintiff’s residence in a forum, id. at 2857 n.5 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788
(1984); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1167-73); (2) the state’s “‘well-recog-
nized interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to seek redress for inju-
ries,’” see id. at 2857 n.5; and (3) issues related to the claim at issues, such as the “[f]low of
a manufacturer’s products into the forum” in a stream of commerce case. Id. at 2855 (quot-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen, Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(indicating that “where ‘the sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve . . . the market for its product in [several] States, it is not unreasonable
to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchan-
dise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others”).
Accord Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 n.5, 757 (2014).
255. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at, 751, 754, 757 (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2857;
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984)).
256. Id. at 751, 757-58, 760; see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014); ac-
cord Twitchell, supra note 4, at 679-680.
257. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-55 & nn.6-7, 761 (emphasis added).
258. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121-22. Walden, however, does require that the defendant
have minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 1119, 1122, 1124-26.
259. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
260. See id. Bauman broadly articulated the first step in a specific jurisdiction analysis
to be whether “the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the
exercise of specific jurisdiction,” rather than whether the defendant purposefully availed
itself to the forum and, thus, received benefits and privileges of forum law. Id. In the sec-
ond step, Bauman instructed, a court “consider[s] several additional factors to assess the
reasonableness of entertaining the case.” Id.
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only jurisdiction based on a party’s relation to the forum:261 Specific juris-
diction should, correspondingly, be construed more broadly.
b. Bauman Clarifies the “Essentially at Home” Standard
The Bauman Court also clarified the narrower basis for general or “all-
purpose” jurisdiction, emphasizing that a state will have jurisdiction to
hear “any and all claims” against a foreign corporation “only when the
corporation’s affiliations with the State in which the suit is brought are so
constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’”262 It thereafter provided much-needed doctrine to guide a court’s
construction of the metaphorical “essentially at home” standard.263
Bauman indicates that “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum”
will create general or “all-purpose jurisdiction.”264 A corporate defen-
dant will be “essentially at home” primarily in the “paradigm” instances
of general jurisdiction,265 or in other forums in which a corporation’s af-
filiations are “comparable” to those of “a domestic enterprise in that
State.”266 For individuals, the paradigm instance is the state of domi-
cile.267 For corporations, the paradigmatic examples are states of incorpo-
ration and principal place of business.268 Although Bauman does not
limit general jurisdiction exclusively to these paradigm instances, it
stresses that finding general jurisdiction outside these cases will require
“an exceptional case.”269 Moreover, it indicates that the inquiry extends
beyond the extent of a corporation’s in-state contacts and requires assess-
ment of all activities of the corporation, including a company’s nation-
wide and worldwide activities, thus emphasizing that a corporation that
operates in many states should not be deemed “at home” in all.270
261. See id. at 755.
262. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 754, 758 n.11 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851));
see also id. at 751 (formulating the standard as that general jurisdiction will exist when “the
corporation’s affiliations with the State . . . are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.’” (citations omitted)). Bauman did not reach the
issue of the nature of agency relationship that would suffice to impute a subsidiary’s forum
contacts to its parent. Id. at 759.
263. Id. at 754.
264. Id. at 760.
265. Id. (citations omitted).
266. Id. at 758 n.11 (indicating that the “essentially at home” will include other forums
in which a corporation has affiliations that are “so ‘continuous and systematic’” that they
are “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State”).
267. Id. at 760 (citing Goodyear 131. S. Ct. at 2853-54).
268. Id. (citing Brilmayer et al, supra note 10, at 735 and referencing Twitchell, supra
note 4, at 633).
269. Id. at 761 n.19 (indicating that “continuous and systematic” contacts generally indi-
cate specific jurisdiction, rather than general jurisdiction); see id. at 761 nn.19-20 (indicat-
ing, inter alia, that the Court “do[es] not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional
case, . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation
or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render [it] at
home in that State”); see id. at 756 n.8 (indicating that, the Perkins case, the solitary in-
stance in which the Court has found general jurisdiction, was an exceptional case in which
the forum could be considered “a surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office”
(quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1144)).
270. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762, n.20.
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Bauman further clarified the more limited scope of general jurisdiction
by explaining the characteristics and underlying policies associated with
being “at home.”271 States of incorporation and principal place of busi-
ness, Bauman emphasized, each provide instances of affiliations with a
forum state that are “unique” because they “ordinarily indicate[ ] only
one place” and they are “easily ascertainable.”272 Additionally, a defen-
dant’s home forum provides a plaintiff with at least one certain forum
where a defendant may be sued for any claim.273
Bauman clarified also that specific (not general) jurisdiction is typically
at issue when a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business” in a state.274 In accord with its conclusion
that International Shoe is “canonical,” Bauman narrowed the jurisdiction
provided by the terms “continuous and systematic” by referring to their
use in International Shoe where, Bauman emphasizes, the Court used
“continuous and systematic” only in discussing specific jurisdiction.275 To
indicate what ultimately has been recognized as general jurisdiction, by
contrast, International Shoe used more restrictive language: “instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substan-
tial and of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”276
Finally, Bauman also omitted language from prior general jurisdiction
opinions that suggested that general jurisdiction could be based (1) on
comparison of a defendant’s forum contacts to the contacts in
Helicopteros and Perkins, repeatedly characterizing Perkins, instead, as
the exceptional outlier;277 (2) on whether forum contacts are sufficient to
render a defendant “present”;278 or (3) on determination of whether the
contacts create “‘continuous and systematic general business
contacts.’”279
In summary, Bauman restricted the scope of general jurisdiction and
indicated that a defendant’s “continuous and systematic” forum contacts
will rise to the level of general jurisdiction only in “exceptional” circum-
stances.280 Unless specific jurisdiction is construed more expansively, the
Court may have tidied up general jurisdiction doctrine at the expense of
271. Id. at 760.
272. Id. (referencing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)).
273. Id. at 746, 760.
274. Id. at 761.
275. Id.; accord Twitchell, supra note 4, at 623-25.
276. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318
(1945) (omitting emphasis added in Bauman)).
277. Compare Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755-57 n.8 (shifting focus from whether particular
contacts are comparable to Perkins or Helicopteros, to characterization of Perkins as the
highly unusual outlier), with Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2856-57 (2011) (assessing the contacts at issue and concluding that, “[m]easured
against Helicopteros and Perkins,” it would not be permissible “to subject petitioners to
general jurisdiction”).
278. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
279. Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
280. See generally Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
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creating two narrow categories that will often require plaintiffs to pursue
defendants in their limited jurisdictional “homes” or other “exceptional”
home-like fora, even when it would be entirely reasonable for a court to
assert jurisdiction in another state based on the relation of the episode-in-
suit to the forum. In the next sections, I argue that the Bauman and
Goodyear decisions also chart a course for more expansive specific
jurisdiction.
2. Bauman and Goodyear: A More Expansive Specific Jurisdiction
In Bauman, as in Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg discussed the reach of
specific jurisdiction. In Section III.A.2, I note that Bauman construed the
supposed “categorical” analysis of International Shoe to classify between
categories of specific and general jurisdiction, rather than to create dis-
crete subcategories of specific jurisdiction with particular, required ele-
ments. I also explore the Court’s return, in Bauman, to more expansive
statements regarding the scope of specific jurisdiction. In Section III.B, I
examine the Court’s application of a truncated reasonableness analysis in
Walden v. Fiore and conclude that the Court should return to an interest
analysis, but it should not limit the analysis by insisting that each interest
reveal forum contacts by defendant.
a. International Shoe’s “Categorical” Approach Revisited
Emphasizing the centrality of International Shoe,281 Justice Ginsburg,
in Bauman, referenced International Shoe’s traditional catechism that a
state court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
if the defendant has “‘certain minimum contacts with [the State] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”282 International Shoe, thereafter, pro-
vided guideposts regarding when jurisdiction might be available under
this formulation.283 Justice Ginsburg also discussed International Shoe’s
so-called “categorical” analysis, but in Bauman, she applied a lens that
envisions a macro approach to the “categorical” analysis.284
Justice Ginsburg discussed the “categories” of International Shoe in
terms of two overarching categories of personal jurisdiction—specific and
general jurisdiction.285 She indicated in Bauman that the category of gen-
281. Id. at 754 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853).
282. Id. at 754; accord Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting International Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316).
283. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945); see supra note 109.
284. See generally, Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754.
285. Id. at 754-58. Justice Ginsburg, thus, retains the “category” or “classification” ter-
minology of International Shoe and post-International Shoe analysis, but she seems to
change the focus by viewing the “classification” at the macro level of specific and general
jurisdiction, rather than at the micro level of types of specific jurisdiction. See generally, id.
Indeed, at one point, Justice Ginsburg notes that “Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this
case into the specific jurisdiction category.” Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758. This change of focus
provides space for courts to extend application of specific jurisdiction to intermediate or
so-called “hybrid” cases.
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eral jurisdiction has become “less dominant” and that of specific jurisdic-
tion has become the “centerpiece,”286 but she made no attempt to divide
specific jurisdiction into “subclassifications” or “subcategories” limited to
the exemplars referenced in International Shoe, that is, to cases of iso-
lated and casual contacts or continuous and systematic contacts. To the
contrary, Justice Ginsburg used expansive language in noting that specific
jurisdiction includes both of these instances and more. Bauman provides
that specific jurisdiction includes (1) “continuous and systematic” activi-
ties in a forum that “g[i]ve rise to the liabilities sued on;” and (2) some
“single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” that permit
jurisdiction “with respect to suits relating to that in-state activity.”287
Rather than suggesting categorical limitation of specific jurisdiction to
these two instances, however, Bauman immediately stated more broadly
that specific jurisdiction is at issue when “the suit ‘aris[es] out of or re-
late[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”288 Bauman counsels
that specific jurisdiction will encompass many instances of claims “related
to” in-state activity, and, thus, also suggests that specific jurisdiction is
more aptly likened to a continuum than to a set of discrete subcategories
with disqualifying requirements.289
In discussing specific jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg also referenced, in
Bauman, an extended passage from von Mehren and Trautman’s initial
article regarding a state court’s specific jurisdiction.290 The referenced
material indicates that “specific” jurisdiction encompasses differing cir-
cumstances, including: (1) various scenarios regarding a defendant’s con-
tinuous relationship to a forum; (2) various scenarios regarding a
defendant’s isolated events or transactions in a forum state; and (3) addi-
tional scenarios involving multiple or indeterminate parties.291 This, too,
286. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at  755, 758.
287. Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasis added)).
288. Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 446 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) and citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011); see also Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2851 (stating that “In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from or connected with the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction’”) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
10, at 1136).
289. Compare Richman, supra note 22, at 1339 (observing, inter alia, that “the relation-
ship between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum connections does not fit well
into two or even three discrete categories; it resembles a continuum more than a two or
three position switch”), with Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Cir-
cumstances”? It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten out the Personal Jurisdiction
Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 58 (2004); Note, Christian E. Mammen,
Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: The Timing of Contacts for Jurisdiction and Venue Under 28
U.S.C. § 1391, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 717-20 (1993) (underscoring the continuing debate
regarding whether personal jurisdiction is comprised of discrete “pigeonholes” of jurisdic-
tion or constitutes a continuum and advocating for a version of the “pigeonhole” approach;
see also B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1097, 1141
(1990)) (noting that the court, had to date, considered specific and general jurisdiction as
separate categories).
290. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1144-
1163).
291. See generally id.
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supports a conclusion that specific jurisdiction is not limited to discrete
categories or subcategories.
b. Specific Jurisdiction and the Relation Among “the Defendant,
the Forum, and the Litigation”
Justice Ginsburg stressed, in Bauman, that specific jurisdiction has be-
come “the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory.”292 This seems
overstated, given the Court’s history of narrowing specific jurisdiction
through use of the purposeful availment requirement and its lack of clar-
ity regarding relatedness of claims. Nevertheless, some Supreme Court
cases can be marshalled to support an expansive view of specific jurisdic-
tion. Bauman referenced those cases.293
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s ambivalence over the past de-
cades regarding specific jurisdiction, the Bauman Court returned, in de-
liberate dicta, to previous, more expansive characterizations of specific
jurisdiction. Bauman emphasized several times that, after International
Shoe, the central inquiry in instances of specific jurisdiction is “the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”294 This lan-
guage—dicta to be sure—permits courts to refocus the specific
jurisdiction inquiry on a consideration of the relation of the defendant to
the forum, but also to refocus on the relation of the “litigation” or “con-
troversy” to the forum—just the interests the Court held to control the
personal jurisdiction analysis before Hanson v. Denckla.295 This was also
the recommendation of von Mehren and Trautman, whom Bauman and
Goodyear cite frequently and with approval, and it accords with conclu-
sions of some current commentators.296
Moreover, in support of its statement that, after International Shoe,
“the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” has
become the central inquiry regarding personal jurisdiction, Bauman also
emphasized both (1) that specific jurisdiction extends to cases in which a
“suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the fo-
rum[;]’”297 and (2) that, in the area of specific jurisdiction, the Court has
moved away from “Pennoyer’s rigidly territorial focus.”298 As noted ear-
lier, Bauman also—although, in dicta—reformulated the first portion of
the two-part specific jurisdiction inquiry so that it would no longer re-
quire a focus on the defendant’s purposeful availment, but on connec-
tions between the forum and the controversy. First, Bauman states, “a
292. Id. at 749 (citations omitted).
293. Id. at 755 nn.5-6.
294. Id. at 754, 757-58 (each quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204).
295. See supra notes 117-147, and accompanying text. Some subsequent cases also privi-
leged the relation of both the defendant and the litigation to the forum. E.g., Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.770 (1984).
296. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1166-76. See, e.g., Effron, supra note
35, at 870-72, 896-98; Lilley, supra note 32, at 113-15; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 679-80.
297. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)).
298. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755.
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court is to determine whether the connection between the forum and the
episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of jurisdiction” and, second, it
“is to consider several additional factors to assess the reasonableness of
entertaining the case.”299
Goodyear, similarly, emphasized—also in dicta—that specific jurisdic-
tion is “controversy”-linked300 or “case-specific,”301 or “case-linked juris-
diction.”302 The Goodyear opinion repeatedly suggested that it is the
broader “litigation,” or “suit” rather than “claim” that must be suffi-
ciently related to the forum.303 The critical referent, thus, becomes the
“episode-in-suit,”304 rather than the “claim,” as Goodyear also empha-
sized that specific jurisdiction derives from or is “connected with” the
“very controversy.”305
The broader focus for specific jurisdiction aligns with the Court’s spe-
cific jurisdiction analysis immediately after International Shoe and before
Hanson v. Denckla. Indeed, conspicuous for its absence in Bauman’s dis-
cussion of specific jurisdiction is Hanson v. Denckla. The Goodyear Court
likewise discussed Hanson v. Denckla only briefly, and then just to re-
strict its application to cases involving isolated or occasional forum con-
tacts.306 As will be discussed below, the Walden Court, too, subordinated
the purposeful availment inquiry of Hanson, although Walden sought si-
multaneously to maintain a principal focus on the sufficiency of the de-
fendant’s forum contacts.307 The Bauman Court, instead of relying on
Hanson v. Denckla, cited McGee v. International Life Insurance308 to il-
lustrate the Court’s rejection of “Pennoyer’s rigidly territorial focus” and
the rapid development of specific jurisdiction when “the episode-in-suit
occurred in the forum or the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
forum.”309 As detailed previously, McGee required assurance that the liti-
gation or “episode-in-suit” was sufficiently related to the forum state to
satisfy due process concerns,310 but it did so in the context of considering
299. Id. at 762 n.20.
300. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)
(citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1136)).
301. Id. at 2849.
302. Id. at 2851.
303. Id. at 2851, 2853, 2855.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2851 (quoting von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 10, at 1136).
306. Id. at 2854.
307. See generally Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
308. 355 U.S. 220, 220 n.6 (1957).
309. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2014).
310. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The McGee Court noted that “[i]t is sufficient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had a substantial connec-
tion with that State.” Id. The Court noted that the insurance contract at issue was delivered
in the forum state, the premiums were mailed in the forum, and the insured resided in the
forum when he died. Id. Thereafter, the Court considered the interests of the plaintiff, the
state, and the defendant and also considered the likely location of witnesses as well as the
likelihood that individual plaintiffs would not be able to pursue small or moderate claims if
compelled to pursue action against an insurance company in a distant forum. Id. at 223-24.
See also Note, supra note 90, at 924 (emphasizing that “other factors [related to the litiga-
tion] may tend both to minimize the inconvenience to the defendant and to strengthen the
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a range of relevant interests to determine if jurisdiction was reasonable
rather than by focusing principally on the sufficiency of defendant’s fo-
rum contacts.
In support of Bauman’s additional statement that Supreme Court deci-
sions “bear out” von Mehren and Trautman’s prediction that specific ju-
risdiction would “form a considerably more significant part of the
[personal jurisdiction] scene,”311 Bauman cited three cases, Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,312 Calder v. Jones,313 and Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc.,314 and it referenced expansive dicta from World-Wide
Volkswagen.315 Admittedly, Bauman discussed these cases in cryptic
parentheticals only,316 and the cited portion of Justice O’Connor’s plural-
ity opinion in Asahi was not applied expansively in that case. In both
Calder and Keeton, however, the Supreme Court focused on the relation
between the “defendant, forum, and the litigation” to determine if spe-
cific jurisdiction was available, and it considered the contours of the par-
ticular claim at issue in light of the range of relevant interests rather than
solely based on defendant’s forum contacts.317 This mode of analysis
would permit specific jurisdiction to attain the centrality Bauman claims
for it.
In Calder v. Jones, for example, a California resident and television
performer filed suit, in California courts, alleging libel by the Florida-
based writer and editor of an article about her.318 Both the writer and
editor challenged personal jurisdiction.319 The editor, in particular, had
few California contacts.320 Rather than focusing first and solely on each
defendant’s purposeful forum contacts, the Court considered the defend-
ants’ concededly few contacts with the forum, but in the context of the
relationship of the litigation to the forum.321 Thus, the Court considered
the plaintiffs’ many forum contacts, which the Court stressed “may be so
manifold” as to permit jurisdiction when it would not otherwise exist;322
the defendant’s conduct, which the Court concluded was “intentional,
interests of the plaintiff and of the state so that in some cases it may not be ultimately
unfair to subject the defendant to suit even in an inconvenient forum”).
311. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1164.
312. Id. at 755 n.7; 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.).
313. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755 n.7; 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
314. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755 n.7; 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
315. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 755 n.7; 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see also infra notes 340 to
341, and accompanying text.
316. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 755 n.7.
317. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (providing that “[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court
properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’”)
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)); Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770, 775
(1984).
318. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85.
319. Id. at 784-86.
320. Id. Calder, the editor, had been to California only twice—once “on a pleasure
trip” and once for testimony in an unrelated case. Id. at 786.
321. Id. at 784-88.
322. Id. at 788.
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and . . . expressly aimed at California;”323 and that the claim of libel was
strongly related to the state of California, both in terms of development
and writing of the allegedly libelous article and of the alleged harm. “The
article was drawn from California sources,” concerned a California resi-
dent, and “the brunt of the” alleged intentional harm would be felt in
California where the newspaper in which the article was published had its
largest readership.324 Under these circumstances and considering the re-
lation to the forum of both the defendants and “the litigation”—which
included the nature of the claim and the interests of the plaintiff and
state—the Court concluded that the defendants could reasonably antici-
pate suit in California.325 Personal jurisdiction was appropriate.326
In Keeton v. Hustler,327 the Court also approved specific jurisdiction
over a libel claim, this time based on a claim by a nonresident plaintiff
against a defendant magazine that had a limited but regular circulation in
the forum state.328 Moreover the nonresident plaintiff sought damages
allegedly incurred in the forum state and nationwide.329 Thus, a portion
of the claimed damages would “arise out of” the defendant’s conduct in
the state, but the “bulk of [the] alleged injuries” had been sustained
outside the forum, and, thus, were loosely related only.330 Again, the
Court stated that, in judging minimum contacts, “a court properly focuses
on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion,’”331 and again, the Court examined relevant interests, including the
nature of the claim of libel and the interests of the defendant, the plain-
tiff, the forum state, and other states, as well as concerns regarding where
the case could be efficiently litigated.332 The Court also indicated that it
must be fair to hale the defendant into Court in the forum in light of the
defendant’s forum contacts and the claim asserted,333 but in Keeton v.
Hustler, this determination would be made in the course of a contextual
interest analysis.
The Keeton Court examined the following relevant connections of the
defendant and litigation to the forum: (1) the defendant had “continu-
ously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market” and could
be held to know that New Hampshire followed the “single publication
rule,” which permitted suit for damages incurred in the forum and all
other states;334 (2) the state’s assertion of jurisdiction would serve multi-
323. Id. at 789.
324. Id. at 788-89.
325. Id. at 790-91.
326. Id.
327. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
328. Id. at 770.
329. Id. at 770-71.
330. Id. at 773. This illustrates Professor Richman’s suggestion that there would be
cases in which a part of the claim was related to the forum contacts and other portions
might be unconnected or only loosely related. Richman, supra note 22, at 1340.
331. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775.
332. Id. at 775-78.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 781.
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ple state interests—the forum state’s “‘especial interest in exercising . . .
jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory;’”335 a forum
state interest in safeguarding its citizens from the deception of libel and in
protecting nonresidents from libel’s reputation-diminishing effects within
the state; and an interest in cooperating with other states—through the
single publication rule—to litigate in a single lawsuit all issues arising
from a libel claim;336 and (3) the lesser, but not nonexistent, interest of
the nonresident plaintiff who sued for libel in the only forum in which the
statute of limitations had not run.337 Moreover, the Court emphasized the
efficient litigation concerns served by the “single publication rule” of lim-
iting duplicative lawsuits and precluding harassment of defendants.338 Af-
ter considering these multiple relevant factors, the Court concluded that
due process permitted jurisdiction.339
In emphasizing the centrality of specific jurisdiction, Bauman also ref-
erenced expansive dicta from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
that would permit personal jurisdiction over claims against a product
manufacturer or distributor in the state of an accident involving the prod-
uct, even if the product had been sold in another state.340 Jurisdiction
would be permissible, under the World-Wide dicta, if the manufacturer or
distributor had taken efforts in another forum to serve, directly or indi-
rectly, the market for its product in the forum state:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as
Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises
from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly
or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not un-
reasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owner or to others.341
In summary, the Bauman Court discussed specific jurisdiction in ex-
pansive terms. Bauman also referenced cases in which the Court based
specific jurisdiction on the relation of the defendant and the litigation to
the forum, rather than focusing solely on the defendant’s forum contacts.
In the Court’s second 2014 personal jurisdiction decision, Walden v. Fi-
ore, the Court also used language that moved toward a reasonableness
analysis, but Walden ultimately applied that analysis narrowly.
335. Id. at 776 (quoting Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974)).
336. Id. at 776-78.
337. Id.
338. Id. 777-78.
339. Id. at 781.
340. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2014) (citing World-Wide, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).
341. Id. at 755 n.7 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)). See also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2802 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (construing the World-Wide dicta to provide that “when a manu-
facturer or distributor aims to sell its product to customers in several States, it is reasonable
‘to subject it to suit in [any] one of those States if its allegedly defective [product] has there
been the source of injury’” (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297)).
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B. WALDEN V. FIORE—A RENEWED RELIANCE ON THE “RELATION
AMONG THE DEFENDANT, THE FORUM, AND THE LITIGATION”
1. The Walden Opinion
Supporting the more expansive specific jurisdiction discussed in
Bauman, the Supreme Court affirmed, in Walden v. Fiore, that specific
jurisdiction focuses on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation.”342 The Walden Court also indicated, in line with a
reasonableness approach, that due process protections underlying per-
sonal jurisdiction primarily protect a “liberty interest,” though, Walden
emphasized, “principally . . . the liberty interest of the nonresident defen-
dant—not the convenience of plaintiff or third parties.”343 Additionally,
the Walden Court stated that, for a state to assert personal jurisdiction
consistent with the Due Process Clause, “the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum.”344 Much of
the language in the Walden opinion accords with the return of the for-
ward-looking interpretation of International Shoe to a place of promi-
nence. The Court also reached an acceptable result. However, as in prior
opinions, the Walden Court seeks to have it both ways—here, examining
a number of reasonableness factors in its due process analysis, but also
insisting, without adequate justification, on viewing all interests through a
defendant-focused lens, which accords with the restrictive interstate fed-
eralism approach.345
342. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121, 1126 (2014).
343. Id. at 1122, 1125 n.9.
344. Id. at 1121-22 n.6. The Walden Court indicated also that specific or case-linked
jurisdiction depends on an afiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy
(i.e., an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore sub-
ject to the State’s regulation) (internal quotations omitted).
345. See, e.g., Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124 (indicating that the “proper lens” for determin-
ing personal jurisdiction is to focus on “whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the
forum” (emphasis in Walden opinion). First, the Walden Court assessed defendant’s rela-
tions with the forum but concluded that “no part of [his] course of conduct occurred in
Nevada,” and, because “defendant’s actions [did not] connect him to the forum,” defendant
had “no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124. Sec-
ond, Walden examined defendant’s relationship with the resident plaintiffs, and specifically
considered that defendant knew plaintiffs had “strong forum connections” in Nevada when
he directed at them his conduct of drafting the allegedly false probable cause affidavit. Id.
Walden concluded, however, that these factors “obscure[ ] the reality that none of [defen-
dant’s] challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself.” Id. at 1125. Third, the
Court considered the nature of the intentional constitutional torts alleged and that, as in
Calder v. Jones, the plaintiffs in Walden suffered injury in the forum state from defendant’s
conduct in Georgia. Id. The Court rejected this as providing insufficient connection to the
forum because, the Court concluded, “[r]egardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an
injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a
contact with the forum State.” Id. Fourth, still considering the claim at issue, the Walden
Court stated that, even if it were to consider the “continuation of the seizure in Georgia to
be a distinct injury, it is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada in any meaningful
way.” Id. Thus, the Court considered many factors relevant to an interest analysis, but
discounted all because they did not show connection of the defendant to the forum. See
Lilley, supra note 32, at 108 (concluding that the Courts insistence on focusing on the
defendant and essentially asking whether the defendant is present in the forum renders its
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In Walden, plaintiffs, who had residences in Nevada and California,
filed suit in federal court in Nevada against defendant Walden, a Georgia
police officer.346 The alleged claims arose from actions Walden took
while acting as a deputized agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA).347 Plaintiffs, professional gamblers, were returning from a gam-
bling trip to Puerto Rico with cash that constituted their “bank” and win-
nings.348 They alleged intentional violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights, arising from Walden’s seizure in Georgia of approximately $97,000
following a search of plaintiffs at an Atlanta airport.349 Walden seized the
money; he later engaged in conversations with plaintiffs’ Nevada attorney
about the source of the funds; and still later, he helped draft an affidavit
showing probable cause for forfeiture of the money, which he forwarded
to the United States Attorney’s Office.350 Ultimately, no forfeiture com-
plaint was filed, and plaintiffs’ money was returned.351
Plaintiffs alleged the following intentional constitutional infractions:
(1) Walden seized their cash without probable cause; (2) he kept the
money after determining it was not related to drug activity; (3) he helped
draft and then provided to the U.S. Attorney a probable cause affidavit
to support a forfeiture action although he knew the affidavit contained
false information; (4) he acted willfully in seeking forfeiture while, at the
same time, withholding exculpatory information; and (5) he failed to give
available exculpatory information to the United States Attorney’s Of-
fice.352 Plaintiffs contended that personal jurisdiction was appropriate in
Nevada because Walden knew when he drafted the probable cause affida-
vit that they were connected with Nevada and knew a delay in delivering
their funds would harm them in Nevada.353 A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit concluded that jurisdiction was proper over portions of the case
based on the “‘false probable cause affidavit’” because, by submitting the
affidavit while knowing that the plaintiffs had “significant connections” to
Nevada, Walden had “expressly aimed” his conduct at Nevada.354
purported examination of the relation among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation
“a hollow refrain”).
346. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119-20.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. Plaintiffs filed a Bivens action alleging violation of Fourth Amendment rights
by reason of the following actions allegedly taken by Walden:
“(1) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping the money after
concluding it did not come from drug-related activity; (3) drafting and for-
warding a probable cause affidavit to support a forfeiture action while know-
ing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully seeking forfeiture
while withholding exculpatory information; and (5) withholding that exculpa-
tory information from the United States Attorney’s Office.”
Id. at 1120.
350. Id. at 1119-20.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1120.
353. Id. at 1119.
354. Id. at 1120.
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Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Walden Court, stated that
whether a state may assert specific jurisdiction in a particular case “fo-
cuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion;’”355 and that “the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a
substantial connection with the forum.”356 The Walden Court cited
World-Wide and Hanson v. Denckla, not as imposing an initial require-
ment to find sufficient “purposeful availment” before a court may assess
the relation of the controversy to the forum, but as requiring (1) that the
relation with the forum state “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defen-
dant himself’ creates with the forum State”;357 and (2) that “our ‘mini-
mum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
there.”358 Walden also referenced portions of Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz359 to support the first statement, but Burger King is more
nuanced, providing also that “[j]urisdiction is proper . . . where the con-
tacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create
a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.”360 Burger King also pro-
vided that the “fair warning requirement” of the Due Process Clause is
met when a defendant “has purposefully directed his activities at re-
sidents of the forum, . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries
that arise out of or relate to those activities.”361 Burger King, thus, sup-
ports Walden’s recognition that a defendant’s forum contacts may “inter-
twine [ ] with . . . transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other
parties.”362 With respect to the second statement, in which Walden em-
phasizes that the “minimum contacts” analysis focuses on the defendant’s
contacts with the forum rather than those residing there, the Walden
355. Id. at 1121 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984).
356. Id. But see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (concluding that it
“is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with [the forum] [s]tate” (emphasis added)).
357. Walden, 134 U.S. at 1122 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985)).
358. Id. (citing International Shoe, Hanson, and other prior Supreme Court cases in
support of the proposition that “our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
there”).
359. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
360. Id. (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) and referencing
Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 94 n.7 (1978) (first emphasis added)).
361. Id. at 472 (emphasis added); see also id. at 476 (concluding that “[s]o long as a
commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat per-
sonal jurisdiction”). Burger King also concluded that the “fairness factor” considerations
sometimes will demonstrate the fairness of litigation on a lesser showing of minimum con-
tacts, and that, if a defendant “purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents . . .
he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Id. at 477-78 (citations omitted).
362. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (2014) (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332
(1980)); Goodyear, at 2857 n.5 (2011) (noting that “[w]hen a defendant’s act outside the
forum causes injury in the forum, . . . a plaintiff’s residence in the forum may strengthen
the case for the exercise of specific jurisdiction”) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788
(1984) and von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1167-73)).
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Court returned to an analysis the Court has used to protect interstate
federalism interests rather than the liberty interest Walden espouses.363
Indeed, the Court’s previous cases analyzing the liberty interest focus on
a broad-based analysis of connections of the controversy, the defendant,
and the plaintiff to the state, as well as issues of litigation convenience.
Walden did, in fact, examine multiple factors important to a reasona-
bleness analysis. It examined the defendant’s relation to the forum, the
relation of the claim to the forum, and the plaintiffs’ relation to the forum
and the defendant.364 It limited its assessment of each factor, however, by
insisting that a court must determine primarily whether “the defendant’s
actions connect him to the forum.”365 This Walden referred to as the
“proper lens” for the analysis,366 but again, that lens is tied to a vision of
interstate federalism, not the liberty interest, as driving the due process
analysis.
Thus constrained to consider multiple factors but only for evidence of
defendant’s forum contacts, Walden could not fully examine the relation
of the defendant or the controversy to the forum as the Supreme Court
did in Calder v. Jones—the primary case to which Walden turns for anal-
ogy.367 Instead, Walden emphasized that defendant Walden’s conduct all
occurred in Georgia and could supply no contact between the defendant
and Nevada: Defendant approached, questioned, and searched plaintiffs
in Georgia rather than in the forum state of Nevada; he seized the cash in
Georgia; and he also assisted in writing the allegedly false probable cause
affidavit and sent it the US. Attorney’s Office in Georgia.368 From these
facts, the Walden Court identified “no jurisdictionally relevant contacts
with Nevada.”369
The Court also examined Walden’s relation with plaintiffs and his
knowledge of their relation with the forum.370 Here, the Court addressed
plaintiffs’ argument that Walden had sufficient contacts with Nevada be-
cause he took intentional action that would affect them, knowing they
had strong Nevada connections and they would suffer injury in Nevada
363. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122. Walden here references one of the statements in Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), that supported protecting interstate federalism
interests: “However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State
that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.” Id. This authority is inapposite
because Hanson was premised on the view that the Due Process Clause, in the personal
jurisdiction context, protected primarily interstate federalism interests, i.e., the “territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States,” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, rather than a
liberty interest—whether of the defendant or others.
364. Walden, 134 U.S. at 1124.
365. Id.
366. Id.. Purporting to examine the liberty interest, Walden concluded that the defen-
dant lacked “the ‘minimal contacts’ with Nevada that are a prerequisite to . . . jurisdiction,”
which is an interstate federalism analysis. Id.
367. Id. at 1123-25.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1124.
370. Id.
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from wrongful conduct.371 The Walden Court concluded that this argu-
ment “improperly attributes a plaintiff’s forum connections to the defen-
dant” and “obscures” that defendant’s conduct had nothing “to do with
Nevada itself.”372 The Court’s conclusory observations provide little anal-
ysis of when and why the plaintiff’s interactions with a nonresident defen-
dant matter, though the Walden Court did acknowledged the relevance of
such interactions.373 Instead, the Court simply refocused on the fact that
defendant’s actions occurred in another state.
As in Calder, the Walden Court also considered that the harm to plain-
tiffs (deprivation of ability to use their money) caused by defendant’s al-
leged intentional conduct would be felt in the forum state, here Nevada.
The Walden Court concluded that the location in which plaintiffs suffered
injury would be relevant only if it showed that defendant had “formed a
contact with” Nevada,374 that is, if it showed that “defendant’s conduct
connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”375 The Court found no
“meaningful” connection because plaintiffs would have suffered injury in
any forum to which they chose to travel and use their money.376 But
Walden again limited its consideration to whether the plaintiffs’ in-state
harm revealed forum contacts by defendant rather than considering
whether that harm, combined with Walden’s knowledge at the time of the
alleged intentional actions that plaintiffs had returned to Nevada, could
create sufficient “contacts, ties, or relations” to Nevada.377 The Walden
Court, thus, concluded that the defendant “lack[ed] the ‘minimal con-
tacts’ with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction
over him.”378 The opinion ultimately devalued the connection of the
plaintiff and the controversy to the forum and relied solely on counting
defendant’s forum contacts. Of particular disappointment, the opinion
did not explain why the connection of the plaintiff and the controversy
are unimportant. Nor did it shed light on how its conclusory analysis
should be used in future cases to determine whether a defendant’s con-
tacts are sufficient.
2. The Walden Critique
The Walden Court reached an acceptable conclusion on the facts at
issue, it articulated an overall correct approach of assessing concurrently
the relation of both the defendant and the litigation to the forum, and it
correctly declined to impose an initial requirement of finding “purposeful
availment.” The Court’s analysis, however, was inapt in several re-
spects—(1) in limiting the liberty interest primarily to protection of the
371. Id. at 1123-25.
372. Id. at 1125. See also supra note 345.
373. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
374. Id. at 1125. See also supra note 345.
375. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125.
376. Id.
377. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
378. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124.
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defendant; (2) in considering, but obscuring and curtailing analysis of,
factors related to the reasonableness of the forum, and ultimately exam-
ining only the one-dimensional issue of the sufficiency of defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum; and (3) in failing to provide guidance to lower
courts.
a. Walden Inappropriately Limits Due Process to Protecting
“Principally” the Defendant’s Liberty Interest
Having recognized the Due Process Clause as protecting a liberty inter-
est, the Walden Court inappropriately limited its analysis to “principally
protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of
plaintiffs or third parties.”379
First, Walden supplied no rationale for the decision to protect “princi-
pally” the defendant’s liberty interest when examining the relation among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. The Court did not indicate
that enhanced protection of the defendant’s interest was necessary to
protect interstate federalism interests,380 to protect the defendant’s con-
venience,381 or to ensure fair notice to the defendant.382 The Court did
include snippets from prior opinions indicating a need to ensure that de-
fendant has forum contacts or connections,383 but again provided no
foundation—theoretic or pragmatic—for focusing solely on the suffi-
ciency of defendant’s forum contacts.
Walden cited World-Wide twice for the proposition that the due pro-
cess limitation on state personal jurisdiction protects “principally . . . the
liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of the plain-
379. Id. at 1122, 1125 n.9.
380. Though the court has vacillated on whether the Due Process Clause protects inter-
state federalism interests, see supra notes 155-212 and accompanying text, the Walden
Court emphasized that the focus of the Due Process Clause for personal jurisdiction pur-
poses is protection of the liberty interest. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122, 1125 n.9.
381. The Supreme Court has several times indicated that “modern transportation and
communication” have lessened the burden of litigation in a foreign forum. E.g., Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980) (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co, 355 U.S. 220,
222-23 (1957)). Further, scholars have noted the relative convenience of most forums; that
parties need not and do not relocate to pursue or defend litigation; that they need not be
present in a state during most phases of the litigation process; and that they often hire local
counsel. E.g., Borchers, supra note 65, at 94-100. Thus, commentators have concluded that
the Due Process Clause would set a very high standard for invalidation of a forum based
on defendant’s inconvenience. See, e.g., id. (noting that some scholars have suggested a
standard of “practical inability to defend” and advocating that standard plus a showing of
an alternative forum “in which plaintiff can meaningfully pursue the claim,” which would
create a limited constitutional forum non conveniens doctrine); Heiser, supra note 10, at
935-36 (suggesting a standard that litigation in the forum “be so manifestly and gravely
inconvenient that the defendant will be effectively deprived of a meaningful day in court”).
The Supreme Court has also indicated occasionally that motions for change of venue could
resolve inconvenience issues. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
382. The Court has previously identified “fair notice” as the basis for the purposeful
availment requirement. That premise has been repeatedly criticized because, among other
reasons, potential defendants receive fair notice of when they will be subject to suit
through Supreme Court opinions. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
383. See infra notes 357-363 and accompanying text.
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tiffs or third parties.”384 Walden, thus, protected the defendant’s interest
by invoking World-Wide Volkswagen for the assertion that due process
principally protects “the liberty of the nonresident defendant.”385
Walden, however, failed to acknowledge the entirety of World-Wide’s dis-
cussion of the liberty interest. The World-Wide Court, in fact, concluded
that protection of the defendant against an inconvenient forum is re-
ferred to as a “reasonableness” or “fairness” inquiry,386 and that it is “im-
plicit” in the reasonableness analysis that the court will, in appropriate
cases, consider “other relevant factors,” including the burden on defen-
dant, the interest of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest, the interest of
other states in the “most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the
shared interest of states in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies.387 In devaluing, theses interests, the Walden Court parts company
with the Court’s prior liberty interest precedent.
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process Clause
protects plaintiffs as well as defendants in the personal jurisdiction con-
text.388 Supreme Court opinions from which the Court’s liberty interest
analysis was drawn also directly assessed the comparative ability of the
plaintiff to sue in the defendant’s home forum in the case at issue and the
384. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122, 1125 n.9 (2014) (referencing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)).
385. Id.
386. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. Walden referenced a portion of World-Wide that
concluded that the “concept of minimum contacts,” in part, “protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122;
World-Wide 444 U.S. at 291-92. World-Wide also indicated, however, that this “protection
against inconvenient litigation” is often referred to “in terms of ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonable-
ness.’” World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. In this analysis, “the relationship” of the defendant to
the forum must indicate that “it is ‘reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit’” there. Id. at 292 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945)). Importantly, however, the World-Wide also emphasized that interests of plaintiffs
and various states and efficiency concerns would be part of the reasonableness calculation
regarding whether the particular forum is reasonable for the particular case. Id. at 292.
World-Wide recognized that the burden on defendant would always be a “primary con-
cern,” but found it “implicit” in a reasonableness analysis that other interests, including the
following, would be considered in appropriate circumstances:
the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220, 223 . . . (1957); the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior
Court, supra, 436 U.S., at 84, 92 . . . at least when that interest is not ade-
quately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n. 37 . . . (1977); the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, 436 U.S., at 93
Id. at 292. Thus, in this attempt to provide virtually unilateral protection for the liberty
interest of the defendant, the Walden Court parts company with the Court’s prior cases,
which would consider the burden on defendant in light of relevant interests. E.g. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (mentioning World-Wide
case); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
387. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.
388. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807, 811-12 (1985). See also Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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defendant’s ability to litigate in plaintiff’s chosen forum.389 Commenta-
tors have, similarly, increasingly concluded that the personal jurisdiction
assessment should include a comparative assessment of the interests and
convenience of the defendant and plaintiff.390 The “symmetry” of the po-
sitions of plaintiffs and defendants is hard to ignore: “If the forum exer-
cises jurisdiction, then the defendant must travel to the forum to litigate;
if the forum does not exercise jurisdiction, then it is the plaintiff that must
travel.”391 And the Court has, of course, continued to indicate that, in
appropriate cases, courts should consider interests of the plaintiff, inter-
ests of relevant states, and considerations regarding efficient litigation as
well as the burden on defendant.392
Indeed, Walden seems implicitly to have made a comparative assess-
ment of the relative ability of defendant and plaintiffs to litigate in the
distant alternative forums in the course of its consideration of the relation
of the claim to Nevada and of the sufficiency of defendant’s connection to
the forum. It concluded that, in these circumstances and on this claim, the
considerations favored the defendant and a denial of personal
jurisdiction.
b. Walden, the Liberty Interest, and the Reasonableness Inquiry
An initial reading of the Walden opinion also suggests that the Court
did not consider factors previously deemed relevant to a liberty interest
analysis—factors regarding the plaintiff’s interest; the claim’s relation to
the forum state and, thus, the interests of the relevant states; and the
interests of the several states in the efficient litigation of the controversy,
in favor of sole analysis of contacts that the defendant himself creates
with the forum state. This would be odd for a Court ostensibly committed
to a “liberty interest” analysis, even one that put a principal focus on the
defendant’s interests. The Court does, in fact, consider several of those
factors, though only in determining if they reveal contacts by defendant
389. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292; accord Kamp, supra note 32, at 39. See also supra
notes 121-147, and accompanying text, for an analysis of the following cases in which the
Court considered the relative ability of the plaintiff and defendant to sue in alternative
forums: McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Vir-
ginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306-13.
390. See Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 61, at 630-33 (reminding that the Due Process
Clause protects plaintiffs as well as defendants and advocating for comparison, in appropri-
ate cases, of defendant’s contacts with plaintiff’s chosen forum with plaintiff’s contacts with
the alternative forum); Clermont, supra note 35, at 451-52 & n.201; Jay, supra note 65, at
459; Note, supra note 90, at 924; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1166-76;
Woods, supra note 16, at 892-93. The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of
a comparative evaluation of fairness of forum. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (stating
that jurisdiction may not be used to “make litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’
that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent” (citing,
inter alia, McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957)); see Woods, supra note
16, at 892-93.
391. Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 61, at 630.
392. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1986); Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 477-78; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
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with the forum. The Court considered the plaintiffs’ relation to the defen-
dant and to Nevada; the relation of the claim to the forums of Nevada
and Georgia; and defendant’s relation to Nevada and Georgia.393 Be-
cause the Walden Court considered each factor in isolation and each only
for purposes of determining if defendant had forum contacts, the reason-
ableness factors seemed almost to be nonexistent. Moreover, considered
in this fashion, the opinion is unpersuasive, and it provides no assistance
in determining the rationale for the Court’s decision that defendant’s
contacts with Nevada were insufficient to authorize personal jurisdiction.
The remedy for these ills is for the Court to fully assess the interests of
the “reasonableness” analysis.
c. Walden Provides Little Guidance to Lower Courts
The Walden Court ultimately failed to provide guidance to lower courts
regarding whether a defendant has the requisite “substantial connec-
tions” with the forum, other than (1) that courts should focus on whether
defendant’s “suit-related conduct . . . create[d] a substantial connection
with the forum State,” (2) that the defendant’s relation to the forum
should “arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the
forum”; and (3) that, defendant’s “effects . . . on [plaintiffs] [we]re not
connected to the forum State in a way that makes those effects a proper
basis for jurisdiction.”394 These conclusory statements obscure the basis
for the decision, continue the ambiguity that has characterized the
Court’s minimum contacts analysis, and provide no principled basis for
lower courts to assess subsequent cases.
Assessment of whether specific jurisdiction is available would be better
protected by a richer analysis of the relation among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation—one that overtly and fully examines the nature
of the controversy or lawsuit and its connections to the forum as well as
the relation of the defendant to the forum. This analysis would broaden
specific jurisdiction, but consideration of the factors important to a rea-
sonableness or fairness analysis would also put appropriate limits on spe-
cific jurisdiction.395 It would also provide needed guidance to lower
courts. The analysis would examine concurrently the relation of the de-
fendant and the episode-in-suit to the forum to determine if there is a
substantial connection with the forum, as Justice Ginsburg suggests, and
then would provide a the second-step assessment of the interests of the
parties and the relevant states, to determine if litigation of the claim at
393. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124, 1124-26 (2014).
394. Id. at 1121-22, 1125.
395. E.g., Effron, supra note 35, at 871-72 (concluding that focus on the relation of the
lawsuit to the forum would help the Court decide individual specific jurisdiction cases and
that use of the “fairness factors” would put appropriate limits on specific jurisdiction);
Twitchell, supra note 4, at 659 (noting that the various “interests” of the reasonableness
analysis serve as “checking factors [that] will allow [a] court [ ] to work with a more gener-
ous definition of ‘related’ contacts without fearing that they will be compelled to grant
jurisdiction in every case”).
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issue in the forum would be reasonable.396 The analysis would also in-
clude, as all must, a minimum background requirement, which would
rarely be implicated, of whether inconvenience alone would warrant dis-
missal of the lawsuit. To prevail on a contention that inconvenience alone
warrants due process protection, the defendant would need to make a
very high showing of inconvenience, along the lines of “practical inability
to defend” combined with the existence of an available alternative forum
in which the plaintiff may meaningfully litigate or that the designated fo-
rum is “so manifestly and gravely inconvenient that the defendant will be
effectively deprived of a meaningful day in court.”397 The defendant in
Walden made no claim of such inconvenience, nor could he have estab-
lished such inconvenience on the facts at issue. Indeed, the court made no
assessment of the inconvenience of the forum to the defendant.
As noted, the Walden Court, in fact, conducted a simultaneous inquiry
regarding the connection of the defendant and the lawsuit to the forum,
but it limited analysis of each factor, thus putting artificial limits on spe-
cific jurisdiction and obscuring the Court’s reasoning. If the Court exam-
ines the relatedness of the episode-in-suit to the forum and conducts an
unconstrained “reasonableness” inquiry, as suggested by Justice Gins-
burg, it would have to make choices, and it might eventually revisit and
revise its initial choices. It is, however, this “reasonableness” inquiry that
would determine the appropriate breadth of specific jurisdiction, impose
appropriate limitations, and provide necessary guidance to courts. Such
an analysis would reveal, in the Walden case, that defendant took inten-
tional action in Georgia that he knew would harm Nevada residents, if at
all, in Nevada. These facts would have permitted the Court to recognize
that the episode-in-suit connected Walden to Nevada. Defendant Walden
had “contacts, ties, or relations” with Nevada, though those connections
were not extensive. The Court could then have moved to the related in-
quiry regarding whether it was reasonable to litigate the claim at issue in
Nevada. The Supreme Court has referred to this inquiry as a “reasonable-
ness” or “fairness” inquiry,398 and it is inquiry that would put the appro-
396. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014); see also Effron, supra note
35, at 871-72 (asserting that the “fairness factors” first articulated in World Wide Volk-
swagen would “guard against excessive exercises of jurisdiction”); Lilley, supra note 32, at
114-15 (suggesting there be a first, but minimal, requirement that defendant “could have
reasonably foreseen the development of an affiliating link with the forum state” and that
thereafter the court could examine the reasonableness of the forum plaintiff selected, in-
cluding, as in a choice of law analysis, the relation of the transaction and the plaintiff to the
forum); Twitchell, supra note 4, at 659 (concluding that all “circumstances surrounding the
suit, including the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts, the nature of their rela-
tionship to the suit, the inconvenience to the defendant of defending in the forum, and, to
some extent, the interests of the plaintiff, the forum, and other states” could serve as
“checking factors” that permitted expansion of specific jurisdiction, but also put reasonable
limits on that expansion); Woods, supra note 16, at 881-82, 890-91 (suggesting an analysis
that requires (1) an initial, minimal governmental interest; (2) fair notice to the defendant;
and (3) an analysis of various “fairness factors”).
397. See supra note 381.
398. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
2015] The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction 159
priate limits on specific jurisdiction.399
Von Mehren and Trautman observed that the Supreme Court used the
following factors in its early opinions to determine if specific jurisdiction
were available: (1) the nature of claim, the dollar amount at issue, and the
extent and nature of the defendant’s and plaintiff’s forum connections;
(2) whether “economic activities” of the defendant or plaintiff were at
issue; (3) whether the defendant was a corporation or individual, whether
the defendant’s “economic activities and legal involvements were perva-
sively multistate,” and whether the defendant’s activities foreseeably in-
volved the risk of harm to people in other communities; (4) whether the
plaintiff acted in a multistate or local manner; (5) the comparative ease
with which the defendant could litigate in the forum and the plaintiff
could litigate in defendant’s home state or other alternative forum; and
(6) issues regarding efficient conduct of litigation.400 The Supreme Court
later reformulated those factors to include all relevant interests, including
those of the parties, relevant states, and efficiency of litigation.401
In Walden, analysis of the defendant’s relation to the forum would re-
veal that the Georgia defendant had no physical “contact” with Nevada
and that the alleged constitutional violations were tightly connected to
preventing drug trafficking in a Georgia airport. A more forthright analy-
sis, i.e., one not constrained to seek only “contacts” the defendant himself
created with Nevada, would acknowledge that defendant was at least
minimally “connected” with Nevada because the particular episode-in-
suit connected him to Nevada: Walden allegedly provided to the United
States Attorney a false affidavit seeking forfeiture of plaintiffs’ money
when he had exculpatory information and he also knew plaintiffs were
residents of Nevada and, thus, knew they would be harmed, if at all, in
Nevada by improper and intentional acts in Georgia to withhold their
money.402 Having found a sufficient connection of the lawsuit to the fo-
rum, the Court would have moved to the second-step assessment of the
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in Nevada over the case at issue.
In the second step, a reasonableness assessment, the Court could have
determined that no interest supported personal jurisdiction. The Court
could have determined that, because the claims at issue were tightly con-
nected to airport security and prevention of drug trafficking in an Atlanta
airport, Nevada had little regulatory interest in the substantive claims,
while Georgia had a heightened interest in providing a forum for the sub-
stantive claims. Nevada’s interest might, thus, have been limited to a
399. See supra note 396.
400. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 166-69; see also supra notes 117-147.
401. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 and recognizing the following relevant interests: the burden
on defendant in litigating in the chosen forum; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining conve-
nient and effective relief; the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the interstate judi-
cial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and the shared
interest of the interstate judicial system in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
402. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1120 (2014).
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state’s ever-present interest in providing a forum for suit by its residents.
Though it has been argued that permitting jurisdiction based solely on a
state’s interest in providing a forum to its residents could be a sufficient
basis for specific jurisdiction,403 the Court has not, to date, accepted such
theories.404
What of the interests of the plaintiff and defendant, the comparative
assessment of the ease to the litigants of suit in Georgia as opposed to
Nevada, and litigation convenience? Here, it is relevant that defendant
Walden was an individual, not a corporate actor; he did not act for eco-
nomic or other gain, but in the course of employment; and he acted to
further national public safety interests. Indeed, the Court could have con-
cluded that the category of substantive claims in which the defendant is a
local or national law enforcement agent, who is sued in another state for
actions taken in pursuit of local or national law enforcement objectives,
may generally favor jurisdiction in the forum of the defendant’s actions
rather than in alternative forums in which nonresident plaintiffs may
reside.
Plaintiffs, by contrast, certainly possessed an interest in suing in the
convenient forum of their residence, but the facts reveal that it was the
plaintiffs who acted in a multi-state manner and for economic gain, while
the defendant in the case was the local actor. Under the analysis pro-
posed by von Mehren and Trautman and other commentators, if one
party acts in an interstate manner and the other acts in an essentially local
way, the interest of the multistate actor in the home forum—here the
plaintiffs—is lessened.405 On these facts, the Court could have found (1)
that,as indicated above, the sole state interest in providing a forum for
redress of resident’s claims was insufficient on the facts at issue; (2) that,
neither the interests of the defendant nor the plaintiffs supported suit in
Nevada; and (3) that the comparative burden to the traveling plaintiffs or
the traveling defendant-law enforcement officer regarding litigation in
Nevada or Georgia favored suit in Georgia. Likewise, considerations of
403. E.g., Lilley, supra note 32, at 115 (concluding that if a defendant could reasonably
foresee the development of an affiliating link with the forum, courts should turn to an
assessment of the reasonableness of the chosen forum); McDougal, supra note 92, 8-9, 13-
14, 26-31 (advocating an analysis that would permit jurisdiction based on a state’s interest,
including the interest in providing a forum for residents to bring suit, subject to defendant’s
showing that the forum would impose an undue burden); Kogan, supra note 84, at 367-71
(presenting a “mutual inconvenience” paradigm for personal jurisdiction that accords little
importance to state boundaries or sovereignty); see also Jay, supra note 65, at 463-64 (ac-
cepting that there may be no jurisdiction in a forum with no relation to the defendant other
than that the plaintiff chose to sue there, but suggesting that usually the defendant does
have some additional relation, though that may simply be that the plaintiff’s move was
foreseeable to the defendant, and, in such instances, the Court should explain why there is
no jurisdiction).
404. E.g., Kurland, supra note 94, at 591; Note, supra note 90, at 924 (state’s interest in
providing a forum has been considered, alone, insufficient); Stein, supra note 35, at 417
(concluding that “the Supreme Court has made clear that an ex poste remedial interest is
not enough to justify jurisdiction, [but] the ex ante [regulatory] interest is, in fact, central to
the Court’s conception of proper jurisdiction”).
405. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10, at 1164, 1166-69.
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the location of the evidence and efficient litigation would likely have re-
vealed that many of the witnesses and much of the evidence relating to
the search at the airport and Walden’s subsequent conduct was located in
Georgia.
Through this type of interest analysis, the Court would have begun the
business of providing guidance to lower courts regarding the factors that
are important in the specific jurisdiction analysis and how to apply those
factors.
In summary, the Walden Court permitted simultaneous consideration
of the litigation’s relation to the forum and the defendant’s relation to
both the forum and the plaintiff, but it considered the examined factors in
isolation and limited consideration to whether each factor revealed con-
tacts by defendant with the forum. The Court seemed to assume that, if it
found a contact by the defendant with Nevada, specific jurisdiction must
automatically follow.406 That has never been the result when the Court
employed a reasonableness analysis.407 Instead, the Court has undertaken
an inquiry to—in the words of Judge Learned Hand, “put [ ] the real
question,”—to determine whether “the extent and continuity of what . . .
[the defendant] has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to
bring [him] before one of its courts.”408 This analysis would also align
closely with Justice Ginsburg’s statement, in dicta, in Daimler AG v.
Bauman regarding the nature of the specific jurisdiction inquiry: “First a
court is to determine whether the connection between the forum and the
episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a
second step, the court is to consider several additional factors to assess
406. See Twitchell, supra note 4, at 658-59 (noting that a defendant’s minimal forum
contacts would not suffice for specific jurisdiction, but would require a focused inquiry into
the fairness of the forum, based on assessment of “the nature and quality of the defen-
dant’s contacts, the nature of their relationship to the suit, the inconvenience to the defen-
dant of defending in the forum, and, to some extent the interests of the plaintiff, the forum,
and other states”).
407. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770 (1984); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Ctr.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950).
408. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). Pertinent
factors have been variously stated by commentators. See Effron, supra note 35, at 871-72
(asserting that the “fairness factors” first articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen would
“guard against excessive exercises of jurisdiction”); Lilley, supra note 32, at 114-15 (sug-
gesting there be a first, but minimal, requirement that defendant could “have reasonably
foreseen the development of an affiliating link with the forum state” and that thereafter
the court could examine the reasonableness of the forum plaintiff selected, including, as in
a choice of law analysis, the relation of the transaction and the plaintiff to the forum);
Twitchell, supra note 4, at 658-59 (concluding that “all of the circumstances surrounding
the suit, including the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts, the nature of their
relationship to the suit, the inconvenience to the defendant of defending in the forum, and,
to some extent, the interests of the plaintiff, the forum, and other states” could serve as
“checking factors” that permitted expansion of specific jurisdiction, but also put reasonable
limits on that expansion); Woods, supra note 16, at 881-82, 890-91 (suggesting an analysis
that requires (1) an initial, minimal governmental interest; (2) fair notice to the defendant;
and (3) an analysis of various “fairness factors”).
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the reasonableness of entertaining the case.”409
IV. AN INTEREST ANALYSIS
In the Supreme Court’s four recent personal jurisdiction cases,
Bauman, Goodyear, Nicastro, and Walden, the Supreme Court justices
have accomplished much. They defined the “home”-based metaphor re-
garding general jurisdiction in a way that provides guidance to lower
courts.410 They continued to fight the good fight over specific jurisdiction
in instances of isolated or occasional forum contacts, replete with inability
of even five justices to agree on a rationale in Nicastro.411 They then con-
cluded, in Bauman and Walden, that, in the specific jurisdiction context,
due process protects an individual liberty interest, but the Court con-
strued the contours of the individual liberty interest differently in the two
cases.412 In Bauman, the Court narrowed general jurisdiction and sug-
gested a broader scope for specific jurisdiction. The Walden Court, like-
wise, used a mode of analysis for specific jurisdiction that purported to
consider the “relation among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion,” but Walden ultimately circumvented that analysis by examining
factors regarding the defendant and the transaction, but only to deter-
mine if they revealed sufficient contacts by defendant with the forum. In
these opinions, the Court used a fairness or reasonableness approach to
limit general jurisdiction, but it could not then agree to extend the same
theoretical approach to specific jurisdiction, with the concomitant expan-
sion of specific jurisdiction that the reasonableness approach would
entail.
In accord with the conclusions in Bauman and Walden that the “inquiry
into the ‘minimum contacts’ necessary to create specific jurisdiction fo-
cuses on ‘the relation [ ] among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion,’413 I conclude that the Court should use an analysis similar to the
interest analysis it has used periodically, but has not yet refined—one that
is similar to the Bauman Court’s suggested approach. Bauman, in dicta,
suggested a two-step analysis. In the first step, the court would determine
if “the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify
exercise of specific jurisdiction.”414 In this analysis, the Court should re-
quire only a minimal relation between the defendant and the forum, or
between the episode-in-suit and the forum. If such a minimal connection
exists, the court should assess, in a second-step, the reasonableness of
asserting jurisdiction over the particular claims in the forum at issue. In
409. 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n. 20 (2014). It would also align with Justice Ginsburg’s analysis
in dissent in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2798 (2011) (Ginsbrug J.,
dissenting).
410. See supra notes 264-279, and accompanying text.
411. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780.
412. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) See also Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 753,
755, 757-58.
413. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 757-58; Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
414. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760 n.20.
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this second step, the Court would examine all relevant interests, including
the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, a comparative assessment of
the convenience of the forum and alternative forums for the parties at
issue, and the interests of the forum state and other states, as well as
interests in efficient litigation of the matter.415 If the Court concludes that
jurisdiction is warranted given the relevant interests, the defendant could,
of course, (1) seek a transfer of venue to obtain a more convenient forum;
or (2) make the difficult argument that the forum was so inconvenient as
to deny due process.416 This type of inquiry would “put the real ques-
tion”—do the defendant and litigation have sufficient connection with
the forum, consistent with the Due Process Clause, to make it reasonable
for the parties to litigate the particular case in the particular forum?
As with International Shoe’s rejection of fictitious notions of “consent”
and “presence,” this analysis, like the Walden analysis, would eliminate
the use of purposeful availment as a fictitious proxy for unarticulated in-
terests of the defendant or of other states. It would also, however, elimi-
nate the artificial barrier that Walden erected to restrict jurisdiction—that
“defendant’s actions [must] connect him to the forum.”417
The analysis should be similar to that used in the pre-Hanson era418
and in some post-Hanson cases, including Calder v. Jones,419 Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.,420 and Justice Ginsburg’s similar analysis in her
dissent in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.421 As indicated in prior
discussions of the cases in which the Court has used a similar analysis, the
interest analysis will necessarily be tailored to address the varying situa-
tions provided by differing claims. Moreover, the interests would be con-
sidered simultaneously rather than permitting any one interest, for
example, the defendant’s, to be considered as a necessary prerequisite.422
Thus, the inconvenience of the defendant, while always a consideration,
but rarely alone sufficient to require rejection of the forum on due pro-
cess grounds,423 would be minimized or strengthened in light of consider-
ation of other relevant interests. The assessment of the connectedness of
the litigation to the forum, in light of the relevant interests, would, thus,
become the prime determinant of the due process inquiry in most cases.
The analysis would, moreover, permit a unified approach for all spe-
415. See supra note 408.
416. See supra note 381.
417. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124.
418. See supra notes 115-147 and accompanying text.
419. 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see supra notes 318-325 and accompanying text.
420. 465 U.S. 770 (1984); see supra notes 327-338 and accompanying text.
421. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2800-04 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
422. See Note, supra note 90, at 924 (noting that, in considering factors jointly, some
“factors may tend to minimize the convenience to the defendant and to strengthen the
interests of the plaintiff and of the state so that . . . it may not be ultimately unfair to
subject the defendant to suit even in an inconvenient forum”).
423. See supra notes 381, and accompanying text.
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cific jurisdiction cases.424 It would, thus, eliminate problems of categorical
analysis, including those problems that have emerged from reading “iso-
lated and casual” forum contacts and “continuous and systematic” con-
tacts to permit jurisdiction only over claims “arising out of” those
contacts. Importantly, the Supreme Court has used a similar approach
periodically and in various types of specific jurisdiction cases, and these
cases reveal that an interest-based reasonableness analysis can be used
effectively. The Court has, for instance, used the approach in instances of
minimal forum contacts,425 in instances in which defendants have contin-
uous forum contacts, but portions of the case are unconnected with the
forum,426 and in instances in which the defendant’s conduct outside the
forum impacts forum residents.427 But this analysis should expand, from
one focused primarily on the quantity of the defendant’s contacts, to an
analysis that focuses also on the relatedness to the forum of the claim, the
episode-in-suit, and the parties.
The Court’s cases involving minimal forum contacts also illustrate that
this interest analysis will appropriately expand specific jurisdiction in
many cases,428 but it also provides for limits in appropriate cases. My ap-
plication of the analysis to the Walden v. Fiore case, for example, reveals
that the Court could have determined, in the first step of the analysis, that
the “connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify
exercise of specific jurisdiction”—Walden allegedly drafted a false affida-
vit to seek forfeiture of money from plaintiffs when he possessed exculpa-
tory information and also knew plaintiffs were located in Nevada and
would suffer any harm from lack of access to the funds in Nevada. That
determination would have warranted moving to the second-step a reason-
ableness assessment. In the second step, the Court could have determined
that the interests of Nevada and plaintiffs were limited, respectively, to
the state’s interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek redress
for claims and a plaintiff’s interest in suing at home—neither of which has
424. Similarly, the Walden Court indicated that its analysis permitted intentional torts
to be considered in a uniform manner, rather than as a specific and different subcategory.
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (setting forth the specific jurisdiction analysis
and concluding that “[t]hese same principles apply when intentional torts are involved”).
425. E.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-91 (1984); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
222-24 (1957); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16
(1987) (applying the following fairness factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen, see
supra note 186, and denying jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of component parts
on the particular facts of the case).
426. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984).
427. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90; Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
428. E.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-91 (finding jurisdiction appropriate over editor of
article who had minimal forum contacts); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24; see also J. McIntyre
Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2790, 2794-97, 2800-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (con-
cluding that jurisdiction was reasonable in the state where plaintiff was injured by the for-
eign defendant’s allegedly defective product, where the corporate defendant treated the
United States as a single, national market; targeted the United States as a whole by seeking
to sell products “anywhere in the United States”; purposefully engaged a domestic distrib-
utor to sell products in any state and attended regular product exhibitions in American
cities; and where the plaintiff was a local actor injured at his jobsite while using defendant’s
product).
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been alone or in combination sufficient to warrant jurisdiction.429 The
Court could have also concluded that neither the interest of the defen-
dant nor that of efficient conduct of litigation supported suit in Nevada
and that the comparative defendant-plaintiff convenience analysis sup-
ported suit in defendant’s forum. Thus, although the second-step reasona-
bleness inquiry would not ordinarily be a demanding one, the Court
could have concluded that, in Walden, no interest supported personal ju-
risdiction in the forum state.430
I close by listing some factors that would generally be relevant to the
interest analysis.431 These factors should, of course, be developed and re-
fined through application in differing scenarios and to differing claims,
thus, suggesting that issues regarding case-type and connection of the
claim to the forum should be as critical as the extent of the defendant’s
forum contacts. Moreover, the list illustrates that the factors interrelate,
with an issue that minimizes or increases a defendant’s interest often im-
pacting the interest of the plaintiff or state.
The nature of the claim will be central to the relatedness inquiry, as
Walden, Calder v. Jones, and other cases indicate, because the claim im-
plicates the nature and strength of the forum state’s regulatory interest
and will often also reveal the closeness of the connection of the plaintiff
or defendant to the state as well as issues of litigation efficiency.432 Both
Walden and Calder, for example, involved intentional torts. Walden cor-
rectly indicated, however, that the intentional tort of libel, which includes
the injury of diminution of reputation, will generally be tied closely to the
state of the libel, the state of the victim of the libel, or the location of the
libelous publication’s dissemination, and to that state’s regulatory inter-
ests. Other intentional torts (such as those related to alleged improper
actions outside the forum state by law enforcement officers in the course
of their work), however, may not be so connected to a particular forum or
that forum’s regulatory interests.433
429. See supra notes 403-404 and accompanying text.
430. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (con-
cluding that, even if there were sufficient forum contacts, a reasonableness analysis would
reveal that asserting jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the circumstances); accord
Kurland, supra note 94, at 591 acknowledging state interest in providing a forum for its
inhabitants, but concluding that plaintiff’s domicile or residence alone would probably not
be a sufficient interest to establish personal jurisdiction); Note, supra note 90, at 924
(state’s interest in providing a forum has been considered, alone, insufficient); Stein, supra
note 35, at 417 (concluding that “the Supreme Court has made clear that an ex poste reme-
dial interest is not enough to justify jurisdiction, [but] the ex ante [regulatory] interest is, in
fact, central to the Court’s conception of proper jurisdiction”).
431. See generally Clermont, supra note 35, at 451-55; Effron, supra note 35, at 896-903;
Lilley, supra note 32, at 111-15; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 660-65; von Mehren & Traut-
man, supra note 10, at 1166-76; Woods, supra, note 16, at 891-98.
432. Effron, supra note 35, at 900-03; Twitchell, supra note 4, at 662-63; Stein, supra
note 35, at 412-13 (noting that personal jurisdiction is “claim specific not trans-
substantive”).
433. Similarly, McGee can be construed to include concern for classes of plaintiffs with
small dollar claims against out-of-state corporate insurers. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24.
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The defendant’s interests will also be important. Among factors that
would generally be relevant are the following: the nature and extent of
defendant’s forum contacts; whether the defendant is a business entity or
natural person; whether the defendant’s in-state conduct, activity, or im-
pacts are in pursuit of economic gain or are otherwise related to the claim
at issue; whether the defendant’s conduct is “pervasively multistate” or
“essentially local,” and whether the defendant typically acts in an essen-
tially multistate manner; whether the defendant could foresee harm to
people in other communities based on its conduct; whether the defendant
acted intentionally; and whether the defendant would be unfairly sur-
prised by litigation in the forum. These issues will, in many respects and
in many cases, overlap with the interests of the plaintiff and state.
Issues relevant to the plaintiff’s interest will similarly include whether
the plaintiff is a business entity or natural person; whether the plaintiff
acted in a multistate, “pervasively multistate,” or essentially local man-
ner; whether the plaintiff acted to pursue economic interests or other in-
terests; a comparative assessment of the ability of the defendant to
litigate in the chosen forum and the plaintiff to litigate in the alternative
forum; and the value of plaintiff’s claim.
Issues relevant to the state’s interest include the state’s regulatory in-
terest in enforcing the substantive claim at issue; the state’s interest in
providing a forum to residents who might otherwise be forced to litigate
in distant forums; the interstate interest in efficient enforcement of litiga-
tion, including considerations of the location of witnesses and evidence;
and whether the forum is one in which all defendants could be joined.
Finally, and perhaps overlapping with all of the above interests—the
defendant’s interest, the plaintiff’s interest, and the state’s interest—is the
consideration of issues relevant to efficient litigation and the administra-
tion of justice. These would include issues regarding the location of wit-
nesses and evidence, ease of applying forum law, and perhaps, in
appropriate cases, whether the forum is one in which personal jurisdiction
may be obtained over all defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the new approach to personal jurisdiction taken
in the Supreme Court’s recent opinions. The Court’s opinion in Daimler
AG v. Bauman can be read as taking initial steps on the long journey
back to restoring the aspiration of International Shoe v. Washington, in
which general jurisdiction would be narrowly construed and specific juris-
diction would be determined by a flexible standard that would permit
realistic assessment of the reasonableness of hailing a defendant to the
particular court, given the particular claims at issue. The Court’s decision
in Walden v. Fiore began down this path, but ultimately turned back, im-
plementing a one-dimensional requirement that a defendant must have
sufficient forum contacts. Walden also required that any reasonableness
factors considered should be examined only to determine if they revealed
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contacts by defendant with the forum. The Walden case, thus, reflects the
Court’s continuing ambivalence regarding specific jurisdiction.
This Article concludes that Bauman and Walden correctly premised
specific jurisdiction on the “relation among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.” To implement this analysis, this Article advocates that the
Court adopt an interest analysis similar to that suggested in dicta in the
Bauman opinion. In a first step, a court should consider whether the epi-
sode-in-suit has at least a minimal connection with the forum. If so, a
court would, in a second step, consider all relevant interests in deciding
whether assertion of jurisdiction would be reasonable. This analysis
would permit both general and specific jurisdiction to be analyzed under
a single conceptual theory; would implement the Court’s recognition in
Walden and other cases that specific jurisdiction primarily protects the
individual liberty interest; would permit specific jurisdiction to respond
realistically to the changes in transportation and communication that
have minimized the previous burden of litigation in foreign tribunals; and
would ultimately provide a unified analysis for specific jurisdiction cases
rather than of a series of category-specific analyses. Such a flowering of
specific would provide coherence to the Court’s personal jurisdiction doc-
trine and would give further legitimacy to its narrowing of general
jurisdiction.
